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FCPA-related,' and 'the most authoritative source for those seeking to understand and apply the
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Aug. 16, 2018)), and author of the book The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct in a New Era
(Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014). Professor Koehler's FCPA expertise and views are informed
by a decade of legal practice experience at a leading international law firm. The issues covered
in this Article, current as of January 1, 2018, assume that the reader has sufficient knowledge
and understanding of the FCPA, as well as FCPA enforcement, including the role of the
Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA and the
resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA scrutiny. Interested readers can learn more
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http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101 (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
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Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010).
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With the election of Donald Trump as President, and based on citizen
Trump's prior blunt statement that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
is a "horrible law and it should be changed,"I some apprentice commentators
predicted that the FCPA was "likely to be substantially weakened, perhaps
even repealed" and that "the era of vigorous FCPA enforcement . .. [was]
over." 2 However, those hyperventilating regarding the FCPA's future were
encouraged to take a deep breath, focus on facts and enforcement
fundamentals, and realize that the FCPA was not going away and that FCPA
enforcement was not going to substantially change. While 2017 enforcement
did not eclipse 2016's record breaking year of enforcement 3 (after all, records
can't be broken every year), this Article highlights that in 2017 there was a
continuation of robust FCPA enforcement by the Trump administration
involving the same enforcement theories and same resolution vehicles used in
prior administrations.
Like prior years, 2017 was notable for enforcement actions against
business organizations across a wide industry spectrum, involving conduct
around the globe, and ranging from egregious instances of corporate bribery
executed at the highest levels of the company and involving hundreds of
millions of dollars to garden variety allegations of sports tickets, intemships
for family members of alleged foreign officials, and charitable donations.4
Additionally, 2017 was also notable for enforcement agency policy and
related developments including the Department of Justice's announcement of
an "FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy."5 This Article, part of a continuing

.

1.
Trump: Dimon's Woes & Zuckerberg's Prenuptial, CNBC (May 15, 2012),
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2012/05/15/trump-dimons-woes-zuckerbergs-prenuptial.html?pla
y= 1
2.
Matthew Stephenson, US AnticorruptionPolicy in a Trump Administration:A Cry of
Despairfrom the Heart of Darkness, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/11/10/us-anticorruption-policy-in-a-trump-administ
ration-a-cry-of-despair-from-the-heart-of-darkness.
3.
See Koehler, Record-Breaking, supra note *, at 93.
4.
See id.
5. See Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the
34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017) (transcript
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-deliversremarks-34th-international-conference-foreign ); see also LUCINDA A. LOW ET AL., 2017
FCPA MID-YEAR REVIEW 1-2 (2017) (reviewing FCPA enforcement in mid-year of 2017);
Richard L. Cassin, Month in Review: January 2017 Was an FCPA Enforcement Blowout, THE
FCPA BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017, 8:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/2/1/month-inreview-january-2017-was-an-fcpa-enforcement-blowout.html (reviewing the individual FCPA
enforcements during January 2017).
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yearly analysis of FCPA enforcement and related developments, provides a
detailed overview of 2017 FCPA enforcement and will be of value to anyone
seeking to elevate their FCPA knowledge.
I.

2017 FCPA

ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, HISTORICAL COMPARISONS,

AND DATA POINTS OF INTEREST

While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed summary
of each 2017 enforcement action, this section highlights certain enforcement
statistics from 2017 and provides historical comparisons by examining the
following sources: corporate DOJ enforcement actions; corporate SEC
enforcement actions; aggregate corporate enforcement actions; and individual
DOJ and SEC enforcement actions. For each discrete statistical category,
January 20, 2017, (the beginning of the Trump administration) is highlighted
so that readers can clearly see how robust FCPA enforcement involving the
same enforcement theories and same resolution vehicles of prior
administrations continued in the Trump administration. This demarcation also
demonstrates that the first few weeks of January 2017 witnessed an unusual
amount of FCPA enforcement activity in the final days of the Obama
administration.
A.

CorporateDOJ Enforcement Actions

6
As demonstrated in Table I, in nine corporate FCPA enforcement actionS
in 2017, the DOJ collected approximately $845 million in net settlement
amounts.

&

6.
Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the "core" approach. The
core approach focuses on unique instances of corporate conduct regardless of whether the
conduct at issue involved a DOJ or SEC enforcement action or both (as is frequently the case),
regardless of whether the corporate enforcement action involved a parent company, a subsidiary
or both (as is frequently the case), and regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC brought any
related individual enforcement action (as is occasionally the case).
Mike Koehler, What Is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action. This method of computing FCPA
statistics is consistent with the DOJ's approach, see Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72, and is a
commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other areas, see, e.g., Jason Hegland
Michael Klausner, SEC Practice in Targeting and Penalizing Individual Defendants, THE
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-and-penalizingindividual-defendants.
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Zimmer Biomet
(Medical Devices)

2

SQM1
(Chemicals)
(Chile)

$15.5M

DPA

Bsreach ot
Prior
Deferred
Prosecution
Agreement
Foreign Law
Enforcement
Investigation
/Media

No

Reporting 13

7.
DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement, and NPA refers to a non-prosecution
agreement. Mike Koehler, The Fagade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 909
(2010); see also Mike Koehler, DOJ Releases Two So-Called "Declination" Letters, yet
"Pursuantto," the Letters, HMT LLC and NCH Corp. Agree to Disgorge $2.7 Million and
$335,000, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 30, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-releases-twocalled-declination-letters (discussing the meaning of declinations with disgorgement).
8. Refers to the event or events that initially prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the
FCPA enforcement action.
9.
Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement action.
10. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Zimmer Biomet
Holdings Inc. Agrees to Pay $17.4 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges
(last updated Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/zimmer-biomet-holdings-incagrees-pay-174-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.
11. The enforcement action involved a criminal information against JERDS Luxembourg
Holding S.6r.l. that was resolved via a plea agreement and a criminal information against
Zimmer Biomet Holdings that was resolved via a DPA. See id.
12. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Chilean Chemicals
and Mining Company Agrees to Pay More Than $15 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Charges (last updated Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chileanchemicals-and-mining-company-agrees-pay-more-i 5-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt.
13. The SEC's administrative order states: "In 2015, in response to inquiries from Chilean
tax authorities and related news articles in the Chilean press, SQM conducted an internal
investigation based on allegations that SQM had taken improper tax deductions for payments to
certain vendors." Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile, S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 79,795,
115 SEC Docket 17 (Jan. 13, 2017).
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14. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Rolls-Royce plc
Agrees to Pay $170 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case
(last updated Oct. 3, 2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/rolls-royce-plc-agrees-pay-170million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.
15. The DPA states: "The Company did not voluntarily or timely disclose [to the
DOJ] . . as the Company's disclosures occurred only after media reports first alleging
corruption by the Company and the U.K. Serious Fraud Office initiated an inquiry into the
Company's misconduct. . . ." Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. RollsRoyce PLC, No. 2:16-cr-00247, 7 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC. ACT REP. § 39:35 (2d ed. 2018)
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2016).
16. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Las Vegas Sands
Corporation Agrees to Pay Nearly $7 Million Penalty to Resolve FCPA Charges Related to
China and Macao (last updated Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/las-vegas-sandscorporation-agrees-pay-nearly-7-million-penalty-resolve-fcpa-charges-related.
17. Complaint, Jacobs v. Las Vegas Sands Corp, No. A-10-627691-C, 2011 WL 5827090
(Nev. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2011).
18. Letter from Jacob T. Elberg, Chief, Health Care & Gov't Fraud Unit, U.S. Attorney's
Office of N.J., Laura N. Perkins, Assistant Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud
Section, & Nicholas Acker, Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud
Section to Lucinda Low, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson LLP & Thomas Best, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson
LLP (June 16, 2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/974516/download.
19. Letter from Nicola J. Mrazek, Senior Litig. Counsel & Daniel Kahn, Chief, U.S. Dep't
of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud Section, to Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Esq., Paul Hastings LLP (June
21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/976976/download.
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(Sweden)
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24

$238M

25
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(Oil Services)

Voluntary

Yes

Disclosure 27

(Netherlands)

20. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Telia Company AB
and Its Uzbek Subsidiary Enter into a Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of More Than $965
Million for Corrupt Payments in Uzbekistan (last updated Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telia-company-ab-and-its-uzbek-subsidiary-enter-globalforeign-bribery-resolution-more-965.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. According to the resolution documents,
[i]n or around September 2012, Swedish public television broadcast a
documentary that exposed Telia's corrupt dealings with the Foreign Official and
the Shell Company in Uzbekistan, and caused Telia to initiate an internal
investigation. Soon thereafter, the Swedish Prosecution Authority also opened
an investigation into Telia's corrupt dealings in Uzbekistan.
Information at 21, United States v. Telia Co. AB, No. 17-CR-581-GBD, 7 FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRAC. ACT REP. § 40:13 (2d ed. 2018) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Telia].
24. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, SBM Offshore N.V.
and United States-Based Subsidiary Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case Involving
Bribes in Five Countries (last updated Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sbmoffshore-nv-and-united-states-based-subsidiary-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-case.
25. Id
26. The enforcement action involved a criminal information against SBM Offshore USA
Inc. resolved via a plea agreement and a criminal information against SBM Offshore resolved
via a DPA. Id
27. See id.
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CorporateSEC Enforcement Actions

As demonstrated in Table II, in seven corporate FCPA enforcement
actions in 2017, the SEC collected approximately $289 million in settlement
amounts.

ivioneiez

mdt

(Food Products)

Action
Action

egoI
32
Investigation

&

&

28. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Keppel Offshore
Marine Ltd. and U.S. Based Subsidiary Agree to Pay $422 Million in Global Penalties to Resolve
Foreign Bribery Case (last updated Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/keppeloffshore-marine-ltd-and-us-based-subsidiary-agree-pay-422-million-global-penalties.
29. This number accounts for various credits and deductions for Singapore and Brazil
enforcement actions. See id.
30. The enforcement action involved a criminal information against Keppel Offshore
Marine USA was resolved via a plea agreement and a criminal information against Keppel
Offshore & Marine was resolved via a DPA. Id.
31. Cadbury Ltd. and Mondelez Int'l Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,753, 115 SEC
Docket 16 (Jan. 6, 2017).
32. The company previously disclosed that "on February 1, 2011, we received a subpoena
from the SEC in connection with an investigation under the FCPA, primarily related to a facility
in India that we acquired in the Cadbury acquisition." Mike Koehler, Scrutiny Alerts, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Sept. 25, 2012), http://fcpaprofessor.com/scrutiny-alerts.

Published by Scholar Commons,

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7
150

[VOL. 70:143

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Action

(Medical Devices)

5

$15M

Administrative
Action

$6M

Administrative
Action

No

/

SQM 3
(Chemical)
(Chile)

Deferred
Prosecution
34
Aereement
Foreign Law
Enforcement
Investigation
Media

37

Orthofix Int'l
(Medical Devices)

Reporting36
Breach of Prior
Deferred
Prosecution

No

Agreement 3 8

Ja trK
39

Halliburton
(Oil and Gas)

20, 2017 (,tr

$29.2M

m Wini____ iis rtit
laqtbe I mu
Administrative
Action

Voluntary
40
Disclosure

Yes

33. Biomet, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,780, 115 SEC Docket 17 (Jan. 12, 2017).
34. See id.
35. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Chemical and Mining Company in Chile
Paying
$30
Million
to
Resolve
FCPA
Cases
(Jan.
13,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-13.html.
36. Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile, S.A., supra note 13.
37. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Medical Device Company Charged with
Accounting Failures and FCPA Violations (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2017-18.html.
38. Mike Koehler, Orthofix International Resolves Enforcement Action Based on the
Conduct of Its Mexican Subsidiary, FCPA PROFESSOR
(July
12,
2012),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/orthofix-international-resolves-enforcement-action-based-on-theconduct-of-its-mexican-subsidiary.
39. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Halliburton Paying $29.2 Million to
Settle FCPA Violations (July 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-133.
40. Mike Koehler, Issues to Considerfrom the Halliburton Enforcement Action, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Aug. 2, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-consider-halliburton-enforcementaction/#more-22850.
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As the demarcation in the above tables demonstrates, the first few weeks
of January 2017 witnessed an unusual amount of FCPA enforcement activity
in the final days of the Obama administration. This dynamic was not unique
to the FCPA space-as the Wall Street Journal noted in an article titled
"Obama Administration Races to Finish Probes, Writing Payments From
Firms:"
The Obama administration rushed to complete a raft of investigations
of big business before relinquishing power, reaching settlements
worth around $20 billion in the past week alone with megabanks, auto
makers, drug companies and others.
The settlements-involving allegations of wrongdoing ranging from
misdeeds during the financial crisis to emissions cheating, from
discrimination in lending to squelching competition-are part of the
usual scramble to close the books on lingering cases when a
presidential administration winds down, especially when transferring
control to the opposition party.46

41. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Telecommunications Company Paying
$965 Million for FCPA Violations (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-17 1.
42. This number accounts for various credits and deductions for contemplated Swedish
and Dutch enforcement actions. See id.
43. Telia, supra note 23.
44. Alere, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,417, Exchange Act Release No. 81,742,
117 SEC Docket 14 (Sept. 28, 2017).
45. See id.
46. Aruna Viswanatha, ObamaAdministration Races to Finish Probes, Wring Payouts
from Firms, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-administrationraces-to-finish-probes-wring-payouts-from-firms-1484792587?mg=prod/accounts-wsj.
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In a legal system supposedly based on the rule of law, it would be nice to
think that the timing of enforcement actions is not based on the career paths
of the individuals occupying the seats of authority. Yet, such thinking ignores
the likely reality that professional aspirations indeed explain the unusual
amount of FCPA and related enforcement actions during the first few weeks
of January 2017. For instance, the above-highlighted DOJ enforcement action
against Las Vegas Sands was announced literally in the final hours of the
Obama administration and was based on the same core conduct alleged in the
SEC's April 2016 against the company. 47 Parallel DOJ and SEC FCPA
enforcement actions against issuers based on the same core conduct are rather
common. However, such actions are typically coordinated and announced on
the same day and the Las Vegas Sands enforcement action represents what is
believed to be the only instance in FCPA history in which the DOJ and SEC
enforcement actions were separated (in this matter by approximately nine
months). 48 Adding to the intrigue, Sheldon Adelson (founder, chairman, and
chief executive officer of Las Vegas Sands) was a major Republican
contributor during the 2016 election and was in Washington, D.C. for
Trump's inauguration on the same day the DOJ enforcement action was
announced.

49

As the demarcation in the above tables also clearly demonstrates, robust
FCPA enforcement involving the same enforcement theories and same
resolution vehicles has continued in the Trump administration. This
enforcement has occurred despite the predictions of some apprentice
commentators that during the Trump administration the FCPA "[was] likely
to be substantially weakened, perhaps even repealed" and that "the era of
5
vigorous FCPA enforcement . .. [was] over."o
For instance, mere hours after
Trump's victory on November 8, 2016, Harvard Law Professor Matthew
Stephenson wrote:
Like many people, both here in the US and across the world, I was
shocked and dismayed by the outcome of the US Presidential
election. To be honest, I'm still in such a state of numb disbelief, I'm
not sure I'm in a position to think or write clearly. And I'm not even

47. Las Vegas Sands Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 77,555, 113 SEC Docket 17d
(Apr. 7, 2016).
48. See id.; U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 16.
49. See Nicholas Confessore, et al. Trump InauguralDrew Big Dollarsfrom Donors with
Vested
Interests,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/us/politics/trump-inauguration-sheldon-adelsonfundraising.html.
50. Stephenson, supra note 2.
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sure there's much point to blogging about corruption. As I said in [a
prior post], the consequences of a Trump presidency are potentially
so dire for such a broad range of issues-from health care to climate
change to national security to immigration to the preservation of the
fundamental ideals of the United States as an open and tolerant
constitutional democracy that even thinking about the implications
of a Trump presidency for something as narrow and specific as
anticorruption policy seems almost comically trivial. But blogging
about corruption is one of the things I do, and to hold myself together
and try to keep sane, I'm going to take a stab at writing a bit about
the possible impact that President Trump will have on US anti[]corruption policy, at home and abroad. I think the impact is likely to
be considerable, and uniformly bad:
*

First, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is likely to be
substantially weakened, perhaps even repealed (though I think
the latter possibility is still relatively unlikely). The FCPA
"reform" crowd the Chamber of Commerce, the defense bar,
and their various supporters will now have a Congress that is
likely to support "reforms" that substantially weaken the statute,
and a President who is already on record as calling the FCPA a
"horrible law." It may not be a top priority of the Republican
Congress and the Trump Administration, but I expect that the
Chamber and others will seize this legislative opportunity to push
through many of the reforms that have been on their wish list for
quite some time.

*

Second, even putting aside possible changes to the FCPA itself,
I fully expect that the era of vigorous FCPA enforcement ... is
over. It's hard for me to imagine that the Attorney General of a
Trump Administration (Rudy Giuliani, perhaps?) would make
prosecuting foreign bribery a significant priority, or would
devote substantial resources to this area. It might take a little
while for the change to become apparent[-]there are still some
cases in the pipeline, after all[-]but I'd be shocked if the US
maintained anything like its current level of FCPA
'

enforcement. 5

5 1. Id.
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Perhaps a law professor in a self-described "state of numb disbelief' and
not in a "position to think or write clearly" should decline to hit the publish
button. But that did not happen, and reflective of the troubled state of "news"
in this modem era, and perhaps due to the institutional affiliation of the law
professor (i.e. a Harvard Law Professor can't possibly be wrong), the above
doom and gloom predictions soon became a narrative that spread like
wildfire.52

This author however, days after the 2016 elections, encouraged all to take
a deep breath regarding FCPA enforcement in the Trump administration and
focus on facts and not speculative narratives. Among other things, the
following salient points were highlighted:
*

Citizen Trump's statement that the FCPA is a "horrible law and it
should be changed" occurred in mid-May 2012 at the height of public
awareness of Wal-Mart's FCPA scrutiny scrutiny focused on
alleged payments in Mexico to obtain various licenses and permits.
Relevant to this type of scrutiny, the FCPA's legislative history
clearly evidences that Congress did not intend to capture such
payments in enacting the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and the
government has an overall losing record when put to its burden of
proof concerning payments outside the context of foreign
government procurement.

*

In any given year, approximately 50% of corporate FCPA
enforcement actions (which then sometimes spawn individual
enforcement actions, related corporate enforcement actions, or
industry sweeps) originate with corporate voluntary disclosures. To
think that FCPA Inc. is going to stop making voluntary disclosures
(disclosures that fuel FCPA enforcement) on January 20, 2017 is
fanciful. Among other things, there are too many people making lots
of money based on the current FCPA enforcement environment for
FCPA enforcement to experience a sudden and dramatic change. In
short, voluntary disclosures will still likely fill up a significant
portion of the FCPA pipeline after January 20, 2017. If you believe
that FCPA enforcement will decline in a Trump administration then

52. See John T. Aquino, Trump Enforcement of Foreign Bribery Law Uncertain,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.bna.com/trump-enforcement-foreignn73014449002; Adam Dobrik, What Will Trump Mean for FCPA Enforcement, GLOBAL
INVESTIGATION REVIEW (Nov. 14, 2016), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/jac/
1073757/what-will-trump-mean-for-fcpa-enforcement; CHARLES E. DUROSS ET AL., TOP TEN
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION DEVELOPMENTS FOR NOVEMBER 2016 (Dec. 16, 2016).
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you presumably must think that the DOJ and the SEC will start
refusing to "process" these corporate voluntary disclosures.
To his credit, one year after making the above "doom and gloom
predictions" (and with much FCPA enforcement still to occur in 2017)
Professor Stephenson publicly admitted that he was "totally wrong" or
"mostly wrong" as to his predictions. 53 Around the same general time, Wall
Street JournalRisk and Compliance reported the following:
[FCPA Unit Chief Daniel Kahn] dismissed the suggestion that
President Donald Trump's previous criticism of the FCPA has had
any effect on the department's enforcement of the law. Mr. Kahn said
he "spanned both administrations," referring to Mr. Trump's
predecessor, President Barack Obama, adding, "I am continuing to
do what I do." 54

This statement from the head of the DOJ's FCPA unit echoed previous
comments from DOJ officials early in the Trump administration. For instance,
in April 2017 the DOJ's Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
stated that "the [DOJ] remains committed to enforcing the FCPA and to
prosecuting fraud and corruption more generally." 5 5 Shortly thereafter,
Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated: "We will continue to strongly enforce
56
the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws."

Even so, what some have referred to as "Trump Derangement
Syndrome"'57 continued to appear in certain FCPA commentary in 2017. For

53. Matthew Stephenson, US Anticorporation Policy in a Trump Administration: An
Evaluation of Last Year's Doom-and-Gloom Predictions, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG
(Nov. 9,2017), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2017/11/09/us-anticorruption-policy-in-atrump-administration-revisited-an-evaluation-of-last-years-doom-and-gloom-predictions/.
54. Samuel Rubenfield, U.S. Justice Dep't Official: Corporate Compliance is 'More
Sophisticated,' WALL
ST.
J.:
L.
BLOG
(Nov.
15,
2017,
5:14
PM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2017/11/15/u-s-justice-dept-official-corporatecompliance-is-more-sophisticated/.
55. Trevor N. McFadden, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice Criminal Div., Remarks at Anti-Corruption, Export Controls & Sanctions 10th
Compliance Summit (Apr. 18, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/acting-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-trevor-n-mcfadden-speaks-anti).
56. Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at Ethics and
Compliance Initiative Annual Conference (Apr. 24, 2018) (transcript available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-ethicsand-compliance-initiative-annual).
57. Trump Derangement Syndrome, URBAN DICTIONARY (updated Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Trump%/`20Derangement%/`20Syndrome.
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instance, when the Trump administration brought its first two corporate FCPA
enforcement actions against Linde and CDM Smith in quick succession
during the summer of 2017, some were aghast that the enforcement actions
were resolved via so-called "declination with disgorgement" agreements.5 ' A
commentator stated:
What's frustrating is that we don't really know how Linde or CDM
Smith met the criteria of the [2016] Pilot Program; or why meeting
the criteria resulted in no prosecution, when under the Obama
Administration a company might have received a deferredprosecution agreement or some amount of penalties. Did these
companies handle their FCPA violations in some fundamentally
better way? Or have prosecutors in the Trump Administration
fundamentally changed their tune, in favor of no corporate
prosecutions?

... If we can't identify what these companies did right, we can't
determine how to emulate that behavior-or whether we can adopt
the cynical view that the Trump Administration just isn't interested
in prosecuting corporations any more ....

I'm not arguing that the Trump Administration needs to punish
all FCPA violations at the more severe levels we saw during the
Obama Administration. It doesn't. There are plenty of good
arguments for declinations. But we don't have any arguments right
now; just declination letters with generic language that the company
met the criteria of the FCPA Pilot Program. 59
Noticeably absent from the commentator's rant were the following facts
(facts perhaps inconvenient if one is trying to spin a narrative that FCPA
enforcement was changing in the Trump administration):

58. See Matt Kelly, Another Vague FCPA Enforcement Action, RADICAL COMPLIANCE
(July
10,
2017),
http://www.radicalcompliance.com/2017/07/10/another-vague-fcpaenforcement-action/.
59. Id.
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*

The Obama DOJ created the FCPA Pilot Program in April 2016;

*

The Obama DOJ announced 5 matters as being resolved consistent
with the FCPA Pilot Program. Three of these matters (Akamai,
Nortek, and Johnson Controls) were 'declinations' (i.e. no
enforcement action whatsoever) and [two] of these matters (HMT
and NCH) were 'declinations with disgorgement' (the same
resolution vehicle the commentator criticized the Trump DOJ for
using);

*

Outside the context of the FCPA Pilot Program, the Obama DOJ
resolved 22 corporate FCPA enforcement actions through nonprosecution agreements (in other words the commentator's
assertion/inference that the Obama DOJ typically resolved corporate
FCPA enforcement actions more harshly than the two instances in the
Trump administration was just plain false); and

*

The 'boilerplate language' the commentator objected to in the first
two 'declinations with disgorgement' used in the Trump
administration was the same general 'boilerplate language' used by
the Obama DOJ.

"Doom and gloom" narratives aside, facts actually matter and as the above
tables clearly demonstrate robust FCPA enforcement involving the same
enforcement theories and the same resolution vehicles has continued in the
Trump administration. Indeed, as highlighted in Tables III and IV below,
corporate FCPA enforcement by the DOJ in 2017 (measured both in terms of
the number of core actions and aggregate settlement amount), while lower
than 2016's record-breaking year of enforcement, was consistent with
historical averages.
Table II
Coprate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010-2017"
2017
2016

9
13

2015

2

2014

7

60. Mike Koehler, Corporate FCPA Enforcement in 2017 Compared to Prior Years,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 2, 2018), http://fcpaprofessor.com/corporate-fcpa-enforcement-2017compared-prior-years.
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2013
2012
2011
2010

7
9
11
17
Table 11

numt (20102017)
Crorate DOJ FCPA Enforeent A ction Settle nt
Settlxfent Amowputs
NYer
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

$845M
$1.34B
$24.2M
$1.25B
$420M
$142M
$355M
$870M

Similarly, as highlighted in Tables V and VI below, corporate FCPA
enforcement by the SEC in 2017 (measured both in terms of the number of
core actions and aggregate settlement amount), while again lower than 2016's
record-breaking year of enforcement, was also relatively consistent with
historical averages.

2015

2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

9
7
8
8
13
19

61. Id
62. Id
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2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

159

$1.07B

$114M
$327M
$300M
$118M
$148M
$530M

Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately in Tables IVI above is informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate law
enforcement agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC FCPA
enforcement actions. 64 On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA
enforcement data in the aggregate is also informative because it provides a
more holistic view of FCPA enforcement.
C.

Aggregate CorporateEnforcement Actions

As highlighted in Table VII, in 2017 the DOJ and SEC together collected
approximately $1.13 billion in thirteen core corporate enforcement actions.
The table also compares aggregate figures to historical figures and highlights
unique circumstances that may have significantly skewed enforcement data in
any particular year.

63. Id.
64. As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over "issuers" (companies-domestic
and foreign with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to make filings
with the SEC). In other words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction over private
companies or foreign companies that are not issuers. Thus, certain DOJ corporate enforcement
actions from 2017 did not have a SEC component because the companies (for instance, CDM
Smith) were private companies not subject to SEC jurisdiction. Furthermore, the DOJ has
criminal jurisdiction over "issuers," "domestic concerns," (i.e., any business entity with a
principal place of business in the U.S. or organized under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies
and persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct "while in the territory of the U.S."
Compared to the SEC's civil burden of proof of "preponderance of the evidence," the DOJ has
a higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof in a criminal prosecution. Perhaps based
on this difference, several SEC enforcement actions in 2017 (such as Mondelez International,
Orthofix International, Halliburton, and Alere) did not involve a related DOJ component.
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1

Sa14VIVI

Mix enlorcement actions mvoivea iraq u ior
Food conduct and these enforcement actions
comprised 40% of all enforcement actions and
approximately 50% of the $149 million amount.

2008

10

$885M

The $800 million Siemens enforcement action
comprised approximately 90% of the $885
million amount.

2009

11

$645M

The $579 million KBR / Halliburton Bonny
Island, Nigeria enforcement action comprised
approximately 90% of the $645 million amount.

/

UU

2010

21

$1.4B

Six enforcement actions, all resolved on the
same day, involved various oil and gas
companies' use of Panalpina in Nigeria.
Panalpina also resolved an enforcement action
on the same day.
Two enforcement actions (Technip and
Eni/Snamprogetti) involved Bonny Island
conduct.
In other words, there were 14 unique corporate
enforcement actions in 2010. Of further note, the
two Bonny Island enforcement actions, Technip
($338 million) and Eni/Snamprogetti ($365
million) comprised approximately 50% of the
$1.4 billion amount.

2011

16

$503M

The $219 million JGC Corp. enforcement action
involved Bonny Island conduct and comprised
approximately 44% of the $503 million amount.

2012

12

$260M

No enforcement actions significantly skewed the
statistics.

2013

9

$720M

The $398 million Total enforcement action
comprised approximately 55% of the $720
million amount.

2014

10

$1.6B

Two enforcement actions (Alstom at $772
million and Alcoa at $384 million) comprised
approximately 72% of the $1.6 billion amount.

2015

11

$139M

No enforcement actions significantly skewed the
statistics.
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2016

I 27

$2.41B

'three entorcement actions (Teva,
Odebrecht/Braskem and VimpelCom) comprised
approximately 56% of the $2.41 billion amount
and five enforcement actions (the three
mentioned above plus JP Morgan and Embraer)
comprised approximately 72% of the amount.

2017

13

$1.13B

Two enforcement actions (Telia and SBM
Offshore) comprised approximately 65% of the
$1.13 billion amount and four enforcement
actions (the two mentioned above plus RollsRoyce and Keppel Offshore & Marine)
comprised approximately 88% of the amount.

Total

155

$9.9B

Once again, "doom and gloom" narratives aside about the future of FCPA
enforcement in the Trump administration, the above tables clearly
demonstrate that robust FCPA enforcement involving the same enforcement
theories and same resolution vehicles has continued in the Trump
administration.
As to the same enforcement theories, Table VIII below highlights the
alleged "foreign officials" in 2017 corporate enforcement actions. In terms of
background, the legislative history is clear that the recipient category
Congress had in mind when enacting the FCPA was bona fide foreign
government officials such as Presidents, Prime Ministers, and other heads of
state. 66 However, in 2017 like in prior years, FCPA enforcement actions did
not always involve such "foreign officials," but rather individuals deemed
"foreign officials" under creative enforcement theories not subjected to any
meaningful judicial scrutiny.

66. See Mike Koehler, The Story ofthe Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
929 (2012), for a detailed discussion of the FCPA's history.
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Ivionaeiez
International

miaan governmern onciais to ootam ncenses ana approvais ior a
chocolate factory

Zimmer /
Biomet
SQM

Mexico customs officials

Orthofix
International
Las Vegas
Sands

Chilean politicians, political candidates, and individuals
connected to them
Doctors employed at government-owned hospitals
The enforcement action concerned the transfer of approximately
$60 million to a Consultant for the purpose of promoting Sands'
business and brands. According to the DOJ: "Several of Sands'
contracts with and payments to Consultant had no discernible
legitimate business purpose, Sands senior executives were
repeatedly warned about the Consultant's dubious business
practices and the high risk of Sands' transactions with Consultant
[including those involving Chinese SOEs]."

67. Mike Koehler, The "Foreign Officials" of 2017, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 22, 2018),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/foreign-officials-2017. Certain enforcement actions technically only
involved FCPA books and records and internal control charges or findings. However, actual
charges in many FCPA enforcement actions hinge on voluntary disclosure, cooperation,
collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues. Thus, even if a FCPA enforcement action is
resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, most such actions remain very much about the
"foreign officials" involved a fact evident when reading the actual enforcement action. See
supra notes 10-60 for these enforcement actions.
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Individuals at FIT Fublic Company Ltd. La I hai state-owned and
state-controlled oil and gas company, which owned extensive
submarine gas pipelines in the Gulf of Thailand, and was
controlled by the Thai government and performed government
functions that the Thai government treated as its own]
Individuals at Petrobras [a corporation in which the Brazilian
government directly owned a majority of common shares with
voting rights, while additional shares were controlled by the
Brazilian Development Bank and Brazil's Sovereign Wealth
Fund]
Individuals at Asia Gas Pipeline [AGP a joint venture between
Kazakh and Chinese state-owned and state-controlled entities
that was designed to transport gas through a pipeline between
Kazakhstan and China. AGP was controlled by the Kazakh and
Chinese governments and performed government functions for
Kazakhstan and China]
Individuals at SOCAR [the Azeri state-owned and statecontrolled oil and gas company]
Individuals at SOC [South Oil Company, an Iraqi state-owned
and state-controlled oil company]
Individuals at Sonangol [an Angolan state-owned and statecontrolled oil company]

Linde Gas

Officials at the National High Technology Center (NHTC) of the
Republic of Georgia, a 100% state-owned and-controlled entity

CDM Smith

Officials in the National Highways Authority of India ("NHAI"),
India's state-owned highway management agency

Halliburton

Sonangol official

Telia

An Uzbek government official, and a relative of a high-ranking
Uzbek government official, with influence over decisions made
by the Uzbek Agency for Communications and Information
("UzACI") - this individual has been widely reported to be
Gulnara Karimova]
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inalviauais

miere

associatea win a set o entities Known as an ntia
Promotora de Salud, or EPS, which provided health insurance
services for their members. These entities were created by
Colombian law as part of the Colombian government's efforts to
provide universal health benefits to its citizens. Under this
system, EPSs were responsible for organizing and guaranteeing
the provision of health services for their enrolled participants and
managing their participants' health risks. Among other things,
EPSs contracted for health services on behalf of their participants
through a network of public, private, and their own health service
providers. EPSs were both private and government controlled."

SBM Offshore

"State-owned oil companies in Brazil, Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, Kazakhstan, Iraq and elsewhere"
Petrobras officials
Angolan officials within Sonangol and Sonusa. [Sonusa refers to
Sonangol USA Co. which is described as a Houston-Texas based
company that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sonangol
described as a state-owned and state-controlled oil company.
Sonusa was controlled by the Angolan government and
performed government functions for Angola.]
Equatorial Guinean officials within GEPetrol and MMIE.
GEPetrol is described as the national oil company of Equatorial
Guinea, controlled by the country's Ministry of Mines, Industry
and Energy [MMIE] and performed government functions for
Equatorial Guinea.
KazMunayGas officials at least one Company 1 employee.
[KazMunayGas is described as Kazakhstan's state-owned and
state-controlled oil company, controlled by the Kazakh
government that performed government functions. Company 1 is
described as a subsidiary of an Italian oil and gas company in
which the government of Kazakhstan granted the company a
concession as the operator of the Kashagan oil field development
in Kazakhstan. In this capacity, Company 1 was acting in an
official capacity for or on behalf of KazMunayGas in awarding
contracts]. Iraqi officials within SOC. [SOC is described as South
Oil Company, an Iraqi state-owned and state-controlled oil
company, controlled by the Iraqi government that performed
government functions.

Keppel
Offshore

Brazilian Official 1 [described as an employee of Petrobras],
Brazilian Official 2 [described as an employee of Petrobras] and
the Worker's Party [described as a political party in Brazil].
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As demonstrated by the above table, of the thirteen corporate enforcement
actions in 2017, seven (54%) involved, in whole or in part, employees of
alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities ("SOEs") with an additional
two actions (15%) involving, in whole or in part, individuals associated with
foreign health care systems.
The SBM Offshore enforcement action is worthy of additional discussion
because buried deep within the approximately one hundred seventy pages of
resolution documents was a notable "foreign official" theory. 68 The notable
theory was likely not a significant factor in the overall resolution of the matter
(after all, the conduct at issue "lasted over 16 years, was carried out by
employees at the highest level of the organization, including two high-level
executives who were at times directors of a wholly-owned U.S. domestic
concern, involved large bribe payments, and included deliberate efforts to
conceal the scheme"). 69 Even so, there are two ways to look at such nondeterminative allegations in FCPA enforcement actions: (1) either the DOJ
(or SEC) are practicing their typing skills; or (2) the DOJ (or SEC) are using
the enforcement action to send a message to the business community,
regarding their FCPA interpretations. The best answer is probably the latter,
and as demonstrated in the above chart, the DOJ alleged that: (1) Sonusa (a
Texas-incorporated, Texas-based company) was an "instrumentality" of the
Angolan government; and (2) a subsidiary of an Italian oil and gas company
was an "instrumentality" of the Kazakh government because it was granted a
concession by the Kazakh government and was thus "acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf' of the Kazakh government. 70 In United States v.
Castle, the Fifth Circuit correctly noted that "foreign officials" were a "welldefined group of persons." 7 ' However, the breadth of the above type of
"foreign official" allegations are practically boundless.
In addition to the same FCPA enforcement theories and resolution
vehicles continuing in the Trump administration, certain concerning
enforcement statistics have also continued such as: (1) much of the largeness
of corporate enforcement resulted from actions against foreign companies; (2)
the continued prominence of NPAs, DPAs, and other alternative resolution
vehicles to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement actions; and (3) the

Mike Koehler, Issues to Considerfrom the SBM Offshore Enforcement Action, FCPA
(Dec.
4,
2017),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-consider-sbm-offshoreenforcement-action.
69. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. SBM Offshore, N.V., Criminal
No. 17-686, 7 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC. ACT REP. § 40:21 (2d ed. 2018) (S.D. Tex. 2017).
70. See supra Table VIII.
71. 935 F.2d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1991).
68.

PROFESSOR
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continued lack of related individual prosecutions in connection with most
corporate enforcement actions.
The first concerning statistic from 2017 corporate FCPA enforcement
was, consistent with prior years, 72 much of the largeness of corporate
enforcement resulted from actions against foreign companies. Specifically, of
the thirteen corporate enforcement actions from 2017, five (approximately
40%) were against foreign companies (based in many instances on the mere
listing of securities on U.S. markets and in a few instances on sparse
allegations of a U.S. nexus in furtherance of an alleged bribery scheme). 73
Even more dramatic, of the net $1.13 billion FCPA settlement amounts from
2017 corporate enforcement actions, approximately 90% was from
enforcement actions against foreign companies. 74
With one exception (Keppel Offshore-Singapore), all of the foreign
companies that resolved 2017 FCPA enforcement actions were headquartered
in countries that, like the U.S., are parties to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(OECD Convention).75 The issue thus arises whether these FCPA
enforcement actions represented a proper use of the FCPA at least from a
policy standpoint. In other words, what legitimate U.S. law enforcement
interests are implicated when for example:
* A Chilean company like SQM interacts with Chilean officials?;
* A U.K. company like Rolls-Royce interacts with alleged officials in
Thailand, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Angola and Iraq?;
* A Swedish company like Telia interacts with Uzebekistan officials?; or
* A Dutch company like SBM Offshore interacts with alleged officials in
Brazil, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan and Iraq?

72. Mike Koehler, FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Foreign Companiesfrom OECD
Convention Peer Countries, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 3, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpaenforcement-actions-foreign-companies-oecd-convention-peer-countries.
73. See supra Tables I and II.
74. See supra Tables I and II.
75. Country Reports on the Implementation ofthe OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG.
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
DEV.,
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/countryreportsonthe
implementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
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Chile, the U.K., Sweden, and the Netherlands are all "peer" countries with
mature FCPA-like laws governing the conduct of their companies coupled
with reputable legal systems to prosecute such offenses. Given this reality, as
well as the specific provision in Article 4 of the OECD 76 Convention that
"[w]hen more than one Party has jurisdiction over an alleged offence
described in this Convention, the Parties involved shall, at the request of one
of them, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction
for prosecution," 7 7 can it truly be said that the U.S. was the most appropriate
jurisdiction to prosecute certain foreign companies for alleged interactions
with non-U.S. officials?
In this regard, the $30.5 million SQM enforcement action is worth
contemplating as the U.S. enforcement action against the Chilean company
lacked any U.S. nexus other than SQM having a form of American Depository
Shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 7 1 Further, the problematic
conduct was exclusively focused on the Chilean company's conduct with
Chilean officials, including political donations made by the company to
Chilean politicians and candidates. 79 When thinking about FCPA enforcement
actions against foreign companies based on sparse U.S. jurisdictional
allegations, it is useful to think about the "flip side" of the action. The "flip
side" of the SQM enforcement action would be Chile law enforcement
bringing an enforcement action against a U.S. company for its interactions,
including political contributions, with U.S. officials premised solely on the
U.S. company listing certain of its securities on a Chilean stock exchange. Is
the U.S. prepared for such a foreign prosecution of a U.S. company given that
some in the world view certain aspects of the U.S. political system to be
corrupt?
Even the DOJ seems to recognize the public policy issues associated with
FCPA enforcement actions against foreign companies. For instance, Sandra
Moser (Principal Deputy Chief of the DOJ's Fraud Section) stated in 2017
that the DOJ is "working harder than ever to coordinate with global partners

76.

See id.; Country Monitoringofthe OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. ECON. CoDEV., https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
OPERATION

77. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS 8 (2011).

78. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(5), 78ff(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2, at
2, United States v. Sociedad Quimica y Minera De Chile, No. 1:17-cr-00013-TSC (D.D.C. Jan.
31, 2017) [hereinafter Sociedad Indictment]; see also Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile,
S.A., supra note 13 (noting the company had "been listed on the NYR since 1993").
79. See Sociedad Indictment, supra note 78, at 3; see also Sociedad Quimica y Minera de
Chile, S.A., supra note 13 (noting the company made "improper payments" to politicians).
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and avoid what some have termed 'piling on' in attendant global
resolutions."s0 She further stated:
Coordination with foreign countries will continue, and that number
of coordinated resolutions will grow, including with new countries.
This is important for several reasons. First and foremost, it is fair to
companies. It encourages companies to cooperate across the board,
because we understand that, at the end of a case, money paid out is
derived from one pie. A resolving company should not have piled
upon it duplicative fines via separate resolutions that do not credit
one another. Although the 'piling on' problem is not entirely solved
by doing this (other countries may certainly try to reach additional
resolutions), our efforts do mitigate this problem, and we are trying
to do better in this regard."
In most of the 2017 enforcement actions against foreign companies
highlighted above there were credits or offsets in terms of U.S. FCPA
settlement amounts for related foreign law enforcement actions. 82 However,
the broader issue is whether the U.S. should have simply backed away from
these enforcement actions because of the related foreign law enforcement
action. For instance, an FCPA practitioner rightly observed that "[n]on-U.S.
efforts to prosecute overseas bribery are hampered by the absence of clear,
credible statements from U.S. prosecutors that they will desist from
prosecuting if a local prosecutor does so in good faith." 8 3 The practitioner
further explained:
This matters because of the baleful, disruptive effect a U.S.
prosecution has on efforts elsewhere. Simply put, U.S. prosecutors
have powers that most of their European counterparts can only dream
of: unfettered discretion, virtual absence of judicial control over
investigations and negotiated outcomes, expansive views of their
extraterritorial powers coupled with the fact that more than eighty

&

80. Sandra Moser, Acting Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud Section,
Remarks at the ACI 8th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption in High Risk Markets 2 (July 25,
2017) (transcript available at https://www.scribd.com/document/355621572/Sandra-MoserRemarks).
81. Id. (emphasis in original).
82. See sources cited supra notes 28-29, 41-42.
83. Frederick T. Davis, Where Are We Today in the InternationalFight againstOverseas
Corruption:An HistoricalPerspective, and Two Problems GoingForward, 23 ILSA J. INT'L
COMP. L. 337, 340 (2017).
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percent of international business deals are denominated in U.S.
dollars, very helpful laws on corporate criminal responsibility, the
risk of huge corporate penalties and the ability to cumulate such
penalties, investigations that last months rather than multiple years,
powers of evidence-gathering from which corporations are virtually
helpless in shielding incriminating information, virtual freedom from
any double jeopardy/ne bis in idem constraints, and flexible
procedures such as DPAs and NPAs-all enable them to move more
quickly, and to strike far more terror into the hearts of corporate
decision-makers, than can European prosecutors.

This situation could lead to trouble. The "level playing field" that
the OECD Convention envisioned was not only a world in which
companies of all nationalities faced the same prohibitions and
comparable risks of prosecution, but in which prosecutors would
have an equal say in outcomes. Given the relative ineffectiveness of
many countries' efforts, the fact that the U.S. prosecutors have
attempted to fill this gap is neither surprising nor, in itself, wrong.
But there are already indications of resentment [in various
countries]. . . 8. 4

In the minds of some," FCPA enforcement has become a convenient cash
cow for the U.S. government and the numerous (and large) 2017 enforcement
actions against foreign companies, which resulted in approximately $1 billion
flowing into the U.S. treasury,8 6 only amplify these concerns.
From a historical perspective, it is worth noting that part of the FCPA
reform discussion in the 1980's were bills introduced by Democrats seeking
to waive the FCPA's provisions in the case of any country which the Attorney
General had certified as having "(1) effective bribery or corruption statutes;
and (2) an established record of aggressive enforcement of such statutes."87

84. Id. at 340-42 (citing Frederick T. Davis, Limited Corporate Criminal Liability
Impedes FrenchEnforcement ofForeignBribery Laws, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Sept.
1,
2016),
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/09/01/guest-post-unduly-limitedcorporate-criminal-liability-impedes-french-enforcement-of-foreign-bribery-laws).
85. Mike Koehler, "Total ly Milking the FCPA Cash Cow?, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 3,
2013), http://fcpaprofessor.com/totally-milking-the-fcpa-cash-cow.
86. See supra Tables I and II.
87. Competitive America Trade Reform Act of 1985, S. 1797, 99th Cong. (1985);
Competitive America Trade Reform Act of 1985, H.R. 3813, 99th Cong. (1985).
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While waiving the FCPA's provisions-as those bills sought to do-does not
seem like a good idea, perhaps the time has come with the maturity of the
OECD Convention for U.S. enforcement agencies to adopt a policy of not
bringing FCPA enforcement actions against foreign companies from peer
OECD Convention countries.
The second concerning statistic from 2017 corporate FCPA enforcement
was that, consistent with the trend in the FCPA's modem era, 100% of
corporate enforcement actions included a DOJ NPA, DPA, or declination with
disgorgement agreement or an SEC administrative action." The common
thread in all of these alternative resolution vehicles is the lack of meaningful
judicial scrutiny. This is ironic because the FCPA enforcement agencies often
preach about the rule of law and how law enforcement should be characterized
by consistency and predictability.89 For instance, in 2017 the DOJ's Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Rod Rosenstein stated: "The term 'rule of law'
refers to the principle that the United States is governed by law and not
arbitrary decisions of government officials. Rule of law systems are
characterized by consistency and predictability." 90
Moreover, in 2017 Rosenstein stated: "Corporate enforcement and
settlement demands must always have a sound basis in the evidence and the
law. We should never use the threat of federal enforcement unfairly to extract
settlements."91
Yet, in the minds of many, the alternative resolution vehicles used in
certain corporate FCPA enforcement actions are used to extract settlements 92

88. See supra Tables I and II.
89. See generally Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Remarks at the Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative Titled "Ethics, Business and The Rule of
Law" (Sept. 18, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputyattorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-penn-wharton-public-policy) ("Rule of law
systems are characterized by consistency and predictability.").
90. Id.
91. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Keynote Address at
the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (Oct. 25, 2017) (transcript available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-morningkeynote-address-us-chamber-institute).
92. See David W. Ogden, Partner & Chair, Gov't and Regulatory Litig. Grp., Keynote
Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform and National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers Symposium on "The Enforcement Maze: Over-Criminalizing
American Enterprise" (May 26, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.wilmerhale.com//media/files/SharedContent/Editorial/News/Documents/2016-06-09-Keynote-RemarksDelivered-at-US-Chamber-of-Commerce-Institute-for-Legal-Reform-and-NationalAssociation-of-Criminal-Defense-Lawyers-Symposium.pdf); see also Mike Koehler, FCPA
Flash A Conversation with David Ogden, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 8, 2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-flash-conversation-david-ogden (providing an interview with
David Ogden where he elaborated on his Keynote remarks).
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and arbitrary decisions of government officials that lack consistency and
predictability have been part of the FCPA conversation nearly as long as the
FCPA itself. For instance, one of the best things ever written about the FCPA
was penned by Robert Primoff, who stated:
The government has the option of deciding whether or not to
prosecute. For practitioners, however, the situation is intolerable. We
must be able to advise our clients as to whether their conduct violates
the law, not whether this year's crop of administrators is likely to
enforce a particular alleged violation. That would produce, in effect,
a government of men and women rather than a government of law. 9
Although this observation was from 1982, the more things change the
more they stay the same. The above comment applies with equal or greater
force in the FCPA's modem era and is relevant to a development discussed in
the next section (i.e., the DOJ announcing yet another non-binding FCPA
enforcement policy). 9
The third concerning statistic from 2017 corporate FCPA enforcement is
the general lack of individual enforcement actions in connection with most
corporate enforcement actions. 95 Specifically, of the nine DOJ corporate
enforcement actions in 2017, six (67%) lacked (thus far any related DOJ
charges against company employees. 96 Similarly, of the seven SEC corporate
enforcement actions in 2017, six (86%) lacked (thus far) any related SEC
charges against company employees. 97 These 2017 enforcement statistics are
generally consistent with historical averages given that approximately 80% of
DOJ and SEC corporate enforcement actions since 2006 have not resulted in
any related DOJ charges against company employees. 98
These statistics are all the more troubling given the DOJ's and SEC's
frequent rhetoric about the importance of individual prosecutions. For
instance, in 2017 DOJ enforcement officials stated: "[the DOJ is committed
to holding] individuals accountable for criminal activity" and that "[e]ffective

93. Robert Primoff, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Implicationsfor the Private
Practitioner,9 SYRACUSE. J. INT'L L. & COM. 325, 329 (1982).
94. See Rosenstein, supra note 5.
95. See supra Tables I and II, and sources cited therein.
96. See supra Table I, and sources cited therein.
97. See supra Table II, and sources cited therein.
98. See Mike Koehler, A Focus on DOJIndividual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 17,
2018) [hereinafter Koehler, DOJ Individual Actions], http://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-dojindividual-actions-2; Mike Koehler, A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Koehler, SEC Individual Actions], http://fcpaprofessor.com/focussec-individual-actions-2.
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deterrence of corporate corruption requires prosecution of culpable
individuals. [The DOJ] should not just announce large corporate fines and
celebrate penalizing shareholders." 99
Likewise, SEC enforcement officials stated in 2017:
[C]ompanies cannot engage in bribery without the actions of culpable
individuals. The Enforcement Division is broadly committed to
holding individuals accountable when the facts and the law support
doing so ... individual accountability drives behavior more than
corporate accountability, a point which is supported by both logic and
experience. The Division of Enforcement considers individual
liability in every case it investigates; it is a core principle of our
enforcement program.1 00
In 2017, the DOJ's Rosenstein stated: "the [DOJ's] rhetoric gets a lot of
attention the policy memos and speeches. But performance is what matters
most."' 0 ' Indeed, actions do speak louder than words, and similar to prior
years, the DOJ's and SEC's rhetoric regarding individual prosecutions, at
least as measured against corporate enforcement actions, remains hollow as
demonstrated by the above statistics.
D. Individual DOJ and SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions
The statistics highlighted above regarding the notable gap between
corporate FCPA enforcement actions and related individual enforcement
against company employees was not meant to suggest that the DOJ or SEC
do not bring individual FCPA enforcement actions. The next section profiles
2017 DOJ and SEC individual FCPA enforcement actions (including
historical comparisons) and highlights the noticeable increase in DOJ
individual enforcement actions compared to historical averages.

99. Rosenstein, supranote 5.
100. Steven R. Peikin, Co-Dir., SEC Enf't. Div., Reflections on the Past, Present, and
Future of the SEC's Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 9, 2017) (citing
Responses to Written Questions from Jay Clayton to Sherrod Brown, Senator, U.S. Senate
(available
at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 115shrg24998/html/CHRG115shrg24998.htm)), (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin2017-11-09).
101. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Keynote Address on
Corporate
Enforcement
Policy
(Oct.
6,
2017)
(transcript
available
at
https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance enforcement/2017/10/06/nyu-program-on-corporatecompliance-enforcement-keynote-address-october-6-2017/) [hereinafter Rosenstein, Corporate
Enforcement Policy Remarks].
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As demonstrated in Table IX, in 2017 the DOJ filed or announced FCPA
criminal charges against eighteen individuals.

Juan Hernandez..
Charles Beech
03
Fernando Ardilal
04

Joo Hyun Balm1
Ban Ki Sang
San Woo

05

Joseph Baptiste '
06

Keith Barnettl
Andreas Kohler
James Finley
Aloysius Zuurhout
Petros Contoguris
107
Anthony Mace
Robert Zubiate

privately-held energy
companies
A commercial real estate
project involving
Keangnam Enterprises Co.
Ltd
Haitian focused non-profit

No

Rolls Royce

Yes

SBM Offshore

Yes

No

102. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Businessmen Plead Guilty to Foreign
Bribery Charges in Connection with Venezuela Bribery Schemes (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-businessmen-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-chargesconnection-venezuela-bribery-schemes.
103. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Florida Businessman Pleads Guilty in
Connection with Venezuela Bribery Scheme (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdtx/pr/florida-businessman-pleads-guilty-connection-venezuela-bribery-scheme.
104. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Four Individuals Charged for Alleged
Involvement in Foreign Bribery Scheme Involving $800 Million International Real Estate Deal
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-individuals-charged-alleged-involvementforeign-bribery-scheme-involving-800-million.
105. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Retired U.S. Army Colonel Charged with
Conspiring to Bribe Senior Officials of the Republic of Haiti (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/retired-us-army-colonel-charged-conspiring-bribe-seniorofficials-republic-haiti.
106. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five Individuals Charged in Foreign Bribery
Scheme Involving Rolls-Royce Plc and Its U.S. Subsidiary (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-individuals-charged-foreign-bribery-scheme-involvingrolls-royce-plc-and-its-us.
107. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Executives Plead Guilty to Role in Foreign
Bribery Scheme (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-executives-plead-guiltyrole-foreign-bribery-scheme.
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Chi Ping Patrick Ho
Cheikh Gadio

1 09

Associated with

Chia

Energy Fund Committee,
CEFC China Energy
Company Limited

Yes

Embraer
Keppel Offshore & Marine

Colin Steven
Jeffrey Chow 1 o

Yes

As demonstrated by Table X, the number of DOJ individual FCPA
enforcement actions in 2017 was significantly above historical averages.

201 /

8Z

2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

8
8
10
12
2
10
33
(including 22 in the manufactured Africa
Sting case)

2009
2008
2007

18
14
7

108. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Head of Organization Backedby Chinese Energy
Conglomerate, and Former Foreign Minister of Senegal, Charged with Bribing High-Level
African Officials (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/head-organization-backedchinese-energy-conglomerate-and-former-foreign-minister-senegal-0.
109. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Embraer Sales Executive Pleads Guilty
to
Foreign
Bribery
and
Related
Charges
(Dec.
21,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-embraer-sales-executive-pleads-guilty-foreign-briberyand-related-charges.
110. Information at 5-6, United States v. Chow, No. 1: 17-cr-00466-KAM (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2017).
111. Koehler, DOJ IndividualActions, supra note 98.
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At first blush, it appears from Table X above that the DOJ brought
numerous individual enforcement actions in 2017 when the reality is that the
bulk of these actions were clustered around just a few core sets of facts. This
observable fact is consistent with prior years as approximately 50% of
individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2006 have
been in just eight core actions. 112
Two individual DOJ FCPA enforcement actions in 2017 are worth
highlighting in greater detail. The first involved Joo Hyun Bahn, Ban Ki Sang,
and San Woo, and involved a real estate project in Vietnam.11 3 What made
the enforcement action unusual is that the third party intended to facilitate the
bribery scheme of a foreign official simply pocketed the money for himself." 4
As stated by the DOJ: "This alleged conduct proves the adage that there is
truly no honor among thieves .... The indictment alleges that two defendants
wanted to bribe a government official; instead they were defrauded by their
co-defendant."" 5 The enforcement action thus serves as an important
reminder that even unsuccessful bribery schemes are actionable under the
FCPA.
The second notable individual enforcement action was against Anthony
Mace (the former CEO of SBM Offshore). In terms of general FCPA
background:
*

Criminal FCPA enforcement
employees are unusual;

*

Criminal FCPA enforcement actions against high-level executives
are even more unusual (the vast majority of individual criminal FCPA
enforcement actions are against sales employees and agents); and

*

Criminal FCPA enforcement actions against high-level executives
based on schemes devised before the executive assumed their
position in which the executive acted with reckless disregard
conscious avoidance are even more unusual.

against large

company

/

actions

Yet, the Anthony Mace enforcement action alleged the following salient
issues:

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 104.
See id.
Id.
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* Before Mace become CEO, SBM Offshore, its U.S. subsidiary, and
others including certain intermediaries entered into an agreement to pay
bribes to foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business for SBM
Offshore in violation of the FCPA;
* When Mace became CEO of SBM Offshore, he held oversight
authority over the entire company, including its Marketing and Sales
Department and was required to personally approve payments
exceeding a certain dollar amount, including those made to outside
sales agents;
* At the time Mace became CEO, he was aware that paying bribes to
foreign officials was a crime under the FCPA and that SBM Offshore
was operating in countries with a high risk of corruption;
* Despite this, Mace joined the conspiracy by continuing to make
payments that furthered the bribery scheme and deliberately avoided
learning that certain payments, including payments Mace authorized
and approved, were in fact bribes paid to foreign officials. Mace's
deliberate avoidance was solely and entirely due to his own actions and
decisions.
The Mace enforcement should be a required read for all business
executives who have oversight authority over a company's operations and are
frequently called upon to authorize or approve various expenditures.
U.S. v. Seng represented another notable development in DOJ individual
FCPA enforcement. Although this enforcement action originated in 2015, in
2017 Seng put the DOJ to its burden of proof at trial, and after a four week
trial, a federal jury convicted him of two counts of violating the FCPA, one
count of paying bribes and gratuities, one count of money laundering, and two
counts of conspiracy "for his role in a scheme to bribe United Nations
ambassadors to obtain support to build a conference center in Macau that
would host, among other events, the annual United Nations Global SouthSouth Development Expo."11 6 The trial was notable because FCPA trials are

116. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Chairman of a Macau Real Estate Development
Company Convicted on All Counts for Role in Scheme to Bribe United Nations Ambassadors
to
Build
a
Multi-Billion
Dollar
Conference
Center
(July
28,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chairman-macau-real-estate-development-company-convictedall-counts-role-scheme-bribe-united.
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rare and the DOJ victory in Seng broke a long streak of DOJ FCPA trial court
debacles between 2011 and 2015.117
Switching from DOJ individual enforcement to SEC enforcement, as
demonstrated in Table XI below, the SEC brought FCPA civil charges against
three individuals in 2017.

Michael Cohen
Vanja Baros" 8
9

Jeannot Lorenz11

UCh-ZiI1

Yes

Halliburton

Yes

As highlighted in Table XII below, the number of SEC individual FCPA
enforcement actions in 2017 was generally consistent with historical averages.

2011

3

2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007

8
2
2
0
4
12
7
5
5
7

117. See Mike Koehler, Forthe First Time in Six Years, the DOJPrevails in a Contested
FCPA ProceedingWhen Put to Its UltimateBurden ofProof FCPA PROFESSOR (July 31, 2017),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/first-time-six-years-doj-prevails-contested-fcpa-proceeding-putultimate-burden-proof.
118. Press Release, Securities & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Two Former Och-Ziff
Executives
with FCPA Violations (Jan.
26, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2017-34.html.
119. Halliburton Co., Exchange Act Release No. 81,222, 117 SEC Docket 5 (July 27,
2017).
120. Koehler, SEC Individual Actions, supra note 98. Yearly analysis of FCPA
enforcement data and related developments can be found in the biographical footnote.
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As highlighted in this section, despite "doom and gloom" predictions
about FCPA enforcement (and the statute itself) in the new Trump
administration, robust FCPA enforcement involving the same enforcement
theories and same resolution vehicles has continued in the Trump
administration. As discussed next, 2017 was also notable for enforcement
agency policy and related developments.
II.

OTHER NOTEWORTHY DEVELOPMENTS FROM

2017

This section discusses two notable enforcement agency policy and related
developments from 2017: first, the DOJ's announcement of an "FCPA
Corporate Enforcement Policy"; and second, the Supreme Court's unanimous
decision rejecting the SEC's position on the disgorgement remedy (the
dominant remedy the SEC seeks in corporate FCPA enforcement actions).
Finally, this section concludes by noting that 2017 was the 40th anniversary
of the FCPA's enactment and encourages readers to ponder, using certain
2017 enforcement statistics, whether the FCPA has been successful in
achieving its objectives.
A.

DOJ "FCPA CorporateEnforcement Policy"

In late 2017, the DOJ announced a new "FCPA Corporate Enforcement
Policy" (CEP) representing its latest attempt (spanning over a decade) to
"increase the volume of voluntary disclosures, and enhance [its] ability to

identify and punish culpable individuals" by "providing additional benefits to
companies based on their corporate behavior once they learn of
misconduct."' 2 ' After providing a detailed overview of the CEP, the following
issues are discussed:

* The obvious logical gap in the CEP;
* Ten specific reasons why the corporate community should take the CEP
with a grain of salt; and
* How the CEP falls short of accomplishing the laudable goals articulated
by the DOJ compared to other alternatives previously advanced.

121. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-47.120(2017).
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For starters, the CEP is non-binding DOJ guidance. As stated by Deputy
Attorney General Rosenstein: "The new policy, like the rest of the
Department's internal operating policies, creates no private rights and is not
enforceable in court.... The new policy does not provide a guarantee. We
cannot eliminate all uncertainty. Preserving a measure of prosecutorial
discretion is central to ensuring the exercise of justice."' 22
According to the DOJ, the CEP is "aimed at providing additional benefits
to companies based on their corporate behavior once they learn of
misconduct."' 23 In announcing the CEP, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein
stated:
The new policy enables the Department to efficiently identify and
punish criminal conduct, and it provides guidance and greater
certainty for companies struggling with the question of whether to
make voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing.

We expect the new policy to reassure corporations that want to
do the right thing. It will increase the volume of voluntary
disclosures, and enhance our ability to identify and punish culpable
individuals. 124

The above policy goals are nothing new. For over a decade, the DOJ has
encouraged business organizations to voluntarily disclose conduct that may
implicate the FCPA so that it can, among other things, increase prosecution
of individuals.125 For instance, the DOJ's April 2016 FCPA Pilot Program
stated:
The principal goal of [the Pilot] program is to promote greater
accountability for individuals and companies that engage in corporate
crime by motivating companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPArelated misconduct ....

122. Rosenstein, supranote 5.
123. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.
124. Rosenstein, supranote 5.

125. Mike Koehler, FCPA Insanity: Doing the Same Thing Over And Over Again and
Expecting
Different
Results,
FCPA
PROFESSOR
(Apr.
11,
2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpainsanity.
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... [T]his pilot program is intended to encourage companies to
disclose FCPA misconduct to permit the prosecution of individuals
whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise never be uncovered by
or disclosed to law enforcement. 126
As stated by former DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Charles Duross and former
DOJ FCPA Unit Assistant Chief James Koukios: "[t]he [CEP's] elements
largely track those of the Pilot Program."1 27 Likewise, others noted that
"[w]hile Mr. Rosenstein characterized these revisions as 'new policy,' they
largely restate the terms and definitions of the prior Pilot Program. . "128
Nevertheless, the key features of the CEP are the following:
When a company has voluntarily self-disclosed misconduct in an
FCPA matter, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately
remediated ... there will be a presumption that the company will
receive a declination absent aggravating circumstances involving the
seriousness of the offense or the nature of the offender. Aggravating
circumstances that may warrant a criminal resolution include, but are
not limited to, involvement by executive management of the
company in the misconduct; a significant profit to the company from
the misconduct; pervasiveness of the misconduct within the
company; and criminal recidivism.
If a criminal resolution is warranted for a company that has
voluntarily self-disclosed, fully cooperated, and timely and
appropriately remediated, the Fraud Section:
*

will accord, or recommend to a sentencing court, a 50%
reduction off of the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(U.S.S.G.) fine range, except in the case of a criminal recidivist;
and

126. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION'S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 2 (2016).
127. CHARLES E. DUROSS ET AL., BUILDING ON PILOT PROGRAM, DOJ ANNOUNCES NEW
FCPA CORPORATE ENFORCEMENT POLICY (Dec. 4, 2017).
128. STEPHEN A. BEST ET AL., THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANNOUNCES A
REVISED FCPA CORPORATE ENFORCEMENT POLICY THAT ENHANCES REWARDS FOR
COMPANIES THAT CHOOSE TO COOPERATE 2 (Nov. 30, 2017).
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generally will not require appointment of a monitor if a company
has, at the time of resolution, implemented an effective
compliance program.

To qualify for the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, the
company is required to pay all disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or
restitution resulting from the misconduct at issue.

The requirement that a company pay all disgorgement, forfeiture,
and/or restitution resulting from the misconduct at issue may be
satisfied by a parallel resolution with a relevant regulator (e.g., the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission).1 29

'

Here again, the CEP's key features of voluntary disclosure, cooperation,
and remediation are nothing new as the Pilot Program contained the same key
features. 3 0 Nevertheless, the CEP is a bit different than the previous Pilot
Program which provided that when those same three steps were met the
"Fraud Section's FCPA Unit will consider a declination of prosecution."' 3
However, the difference between the CEP's "presumption" and the Pilot
Program's "will consider" in non-binding DOJ guidance is likely slight.
Moreover, and very importantly, the "presumption" in the CEP is not a
presumption that there will be no enforcement action, only that the
enforcement action will take the form of disgorgement/forfeiture. 3 2 As
alluded to above, even if a business organization engages in the three steps
contemplated by the CEP and the aggravating circumstances are not present,
a business organization will still be subject to an enforcement action by the
DOJ, SEC, or another relevant regulatory agency to pay "all disgorgement,
forfeiture, and/or restitution resulting from the misconduct at issue."' 33 This
form of resolution is nothing new, as the DOJ publicly announced seven socalled "declinations" consistent with the previous Pilot Program. 114 Three of
the so-called "declinations" involved issuers (Nortek, Akamai Technologies,

129. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.
130. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 126.
131. Id., at 9.
132. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.
133. Id.
134. See Declinations, U. S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/pilotprogram/declinations (last updated Aug. 23, 2018).
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and Johnson Controls)1 35 and thus the disgorgement was satisfied by a parallel
resolution with the SEC. Four of the so-called "declinations" involved nonissuers (HMT, NCH, Linde and CDM Smith) and pursuant to these resolutions
the companies were required to pay disgorgement and/or forfeiture in the
following amounts: $2.7 million; $335,000; $11.2 million; and $4 million.1 36
In short, the notion that the CEP provides amnesty or allows a business
organization to escape an enforcement action is simply false.
If certain of the aggravating circumstances are present, the CEP states:
If a criminal resolution is warranted for a company that has
voluntarily self-disclosed, fully cooperated, and timely and
appropriately remediated, the Fraud Section:
*

will accord, or recommend to a sentencing court, a 50%
reduction off of the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(U.S.S.G.) fine range, except in the case of a criminal recidivist;
and

&

&

135. See Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div.
Fraud Section, to Jay Holtmeier, Esq. & Erin G.H. Sloane, Esq., WilmerHale (June 21, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/874566/download;
Letter from Daniel Kahn,
Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud Section, to Josh Levy, Esq. & Ryan
Rohlfsen, Esq., Ropes & Gray LLP (June 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/865411,/download; Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice
Criminal Div. Fraud Section, to Luke Cadigan, Esq., K&L Gates (June 3, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865406/download.
136. See Letter from Nicola J. Mrazek, Senior Litigation Counsel & Daniel Kahn, Chief,
U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud Section, to Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Esq., Paul Hastings
LLP (June 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/976976/download;
Letter from Jacob T. Elberg, Chief, U.S. Attorney's Office Health Care & Gov't Fraud Unit
Laura N. Perkins, Assistant Chief, & Nicholas Acker, Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Dep't of
Justice Criminal Div. Fraud Section, to Lucinda Low, Esq. & Thomas Best, Esq., Steptoe
Johnson LLP (June 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/974516/download;
Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, & Lorinda Laryea, Trial Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice
Criminal Div. Fraud Section, to Steven A. Tyrell, Esq. (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899116/download; Letter from Laura N. Perkins,
Assistant Chief, Rohan A. Virginkar, Trial Attorney, & Daniel S. Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S.
Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud Section, to Paul E. Coggins, Esq. & Kiprian Mendrygal,
Esq.,
Locke
Lord
LLP
(Sept.
29,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/899121/download.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss1/7

40

Koehler: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Continuity in a Transition Year
FCPA CONTINUITY

2018]
*

183

generally will not require appointment of a monitor if a company
has, at the time of resolution, implemented an effective
compliance program.13 7

In this regard, the CEP is slightly different compared to the previous Pilot
Program, which stated:
[I]f a criminal resolution is warranted, the Fraud Section's FCPA
Unit:
*

may accord up to a 50% reduction off the bottom end of the
Sentencing Guidelines fine range, if a fine is sought; and

*

generally should not require appointment of a monitor if a
company has, at the time of resolution, implemented an effective
compliance program.' 3 8

Here again however, the difference between "will" and "may / should" in
non-binding DOJ guidance is likely slight.
If a business organization does not voluntarily disclose, but the DOJ
learns of the organization's alleged improper conduct, the CEP states (similar
to the previous Pilot Program):
If a company did not voluntarily disclose its misconduct to the
Department of Justice (the Department) in accordance with the
standards set forth [elsewhere in the policy], but later fully
cooperated and timely and appropriately remediated in accordance
with the standards set forth [elsewhere in the policy], the company
will receive, or the Department will recommend to a sentencing court,
up to a 25% reduction off of the low end of the U.S.S.G. fine range. 39
With a comprehensive understanding of the CEP, the following issues are
next discussed:
* The obvious logical gap in the CEP;
* How the CEP, both in terms of rhetoric and substance, is really
nothing new;

137. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.

138. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 126, at 8 (emphasis added).
139. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.
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Ten specific reasons why the corporate community should take
the CEP with a grain of salt; and
How the CEP falls short of accomplishing the laudable goals
articulated by the DOJ compared to other alternatives previously
advanced.

Prior to addressing the obvious logical gap in the CEP, it is important to
understand the informational gap that the CEP (and prior to that the Pilot
Program and prior to that, numerous DOJ pronouncements) seeks to address.
This gap is best demonstrated by the below picture.
Evidence
of Violations

Enforcement

In other words, business organizations (whether through internal audits,
compliance hotlines, or other means) often possess information that employees
within the organization or third parties engaged by the organization may have
violated the FCPA. Because business organizations generally do not have a
legal obligation to disclose this information (a fact rightly recognized in the
CEP and previously in the pilot program), the FCPA's dual enforcers the
DOJ and SEC-often do not learn about potential FCPA violations. 1 40As
candidly stated by then Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell in
connection with the Pilot Program, "the DOJ is 'confident that there are lots of
FCPA violations' that do not come to the DOJ's attention."1 41 As a result, there
are likely many FCPA violations (at least based on current enforcement
theories) that occur in the global marketplace that are not disclosed to the

140. Mike Koehler, Grading the DOJ's Foreign CorruptPracticesAct 'PilotProgram,'
11 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 353, 354 (Apr. 29, 2016); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra

note 126, at 4 ("Nothing in the Guidance is intended to suggest that the government can require
business organizations to voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, or remediate. Companies remain
free to reject these options and forego the credit available under the pilot program.").
141. Mike Koehler, DOJ Announces "New" One-Year FCPA "PilotProgram," FCPA
PROFESSOR (Apr. 5, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-announces-new-one-year-fcpa-pilotprogram.
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enforcement agencies." Because such violations (again in the eyes of the
enforcement agencies) are not disclosed to the enforcement agencies, there is
no enforcement action. Because there is no enforcement action, the individual
or individuals engaging in the problematic conduct will not be held legally
accountable. Because the individuals are not being held legally accountable,
FCPA enforcement is not as effective as it could be for achieving maximum
deterrence. Indeed, in announcing the CEP, Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein rightly observed that "[e]ffective deterrence of corporate corruption
requires prosecution of culpable individuals."1 42
As depicted in the above picture, the FCPA enforcement landscape thus
has a deep gorge, and how to bridge this gorge has long perplexed the FCPA
enforcement agencies. As discussed below, encouraging voluntary disclosure
of FCPA violations by business organizations has long been part of the DOJ's
FCPA talking points.
Yet, this objective suffers from an obvious logical gap in that for years
the DOJ has had the opportunity to do just what the CEP (and previously the
Pilot Program) seeks to accomplish. Specifically, since 2011 twenty-five
corporate FCPA enforcement actions originated with voluntary disclosures.1 43
However, in only five instances (20%) was there a related DOJ prosecution
of a company employee.1 44 Perhaps even more on point, since the April 2016
Pilot Program, the DOJ has self-identified seven corporate matters as being
resolved consistent with the Pilot Program, yet not one instance resulted in a
related FCPA prosecution of a company employee.1 45 The DOJ's stated
objective in establishing the CEP thus seems to lack credibility for the simple
fact that if the goal of the CEP is to encourage voluntary disclosures in order
to permit the DOJ to prosecute company employees, then why have zero of
the matters the DOJ has self-identified as being resolved consistently with the
Pilot Program and more broadly 80% of DOJ corporate actions over the past
six years-not resulted in any related DOJ FCPA prosecution of company
employees? Logical gaps aside, it is important to recognize, as alluded to
above, that the CEP, both in terms of rhetoric and substance, is really nothing
new.
To be clear, this section does not advocate or even imply that the
corporate community should ignore the CEP. After all, the DOJ has extreme
leverage over business organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny and it is always
wise to at least be cognizant of what an adversary possessing a big and sharp

142.
143.
144.
145.

Rosenstein, supranote 5.
Statistics on file with author.
Statistics on file with author.
See sources cited supra 135-36.
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stick is saying. Nevertheless, absent limited circumstances not often present
in instances of FCPA scrutiny, how to respond to internal breaches of FCPA
compliance policies is a business decision entrusted to those charged with
managing the business organization. In exercising this business judgment, the
corporate community should take the CEP with a grain of salt for the reasons
described above and for the additional ten reasons described below.
First, as discussed above, the CEP is non-binding and commits the DOJ
to absolutely nothing. Like prior DOJ FCPA guidance, such as the 2016 Pilot
Program and the 2012 FCPA Guidance, in connection with release of the CEP
Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein stated: "The new policy, like the rest of
the Department's internal operating policies, creates no private rights and is
not enforceable in court."1

46

Sure, unlike prior FCPA Guidance, the CEP is incorporated into the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual but here again it is important to highlight that the first
section of the USAM (1-1.200) states:
The Justice Manual provides [only] internal DOJ guidance. It is not
intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on
otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the DOJ.147
Second, the notion that the CEP somehow provides immunity, a pass, or
promises no enforcement action is simply false. Yet here again, certain
commentators were either uninformed or suffering from Trump Derangement
Syndrome. For instance, referring to the CEP Ren Steinzor (a University of
Maryland law professor and member scholar at the Center for Progressive
Reform) wrote:
In November 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein told a
group of industry executives that DOJ would not indict companies
that voluntarily came forward to report violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. Although he preserved "a measure of
prosecutorial discretion," his announcement was clearly intended to
eliminate an Obama-era policy that required companies to come

146. Rosenstein, supranote 5.
147. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-1.200 (2018).
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forward to share information about their employees' illegal activities
without receiving such assurances. 148
As the above information demonstrates, the notion that the CEP
represents a DOJ position not to "indict companies that voluntarily c[o]me
forward to report [FCPA] violations" is clearly false and the CEP is clearly an
extension of the Obama-era Pilot Program not an "elimination" of the Pilot
Program. 149
Regardless, and as highlighted above, even if a business organization
does all that the DOJ wants it to do under the CEP, there is still a requirement
that a "company is required to pay all disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or
restitution resulting from the misconduct at issue."' In short, the best a
business organization can do under the CEP is an FCPA enforcement action
(albeit using a recently invented and creative form) and all of the potential
collateral consequences of an FCPA enforcement action (negative media
coverage, reputational damage, related civil litigation, etc.) are still likely to
result.
Third, even gaining the greatest benefit under the CEP (a mere
requirement of a disgorgement / forfeiture enforcement action) is contingent
upon a business organization meeting the DOJ's vague concepts of "voluntary
self-disclosure," "full cooperation," and "timely and appropriate
remediation."'"I Among other key terms or concepts that the DOJ possesses
absolute, unreviewable discretion over are:
* the definition of an "imminent threat of disclosure";
* the definition of "reasonably prompt time";
* the definition of "all relevant facts";
* the definition of "disclosure on a timely basis of all facts relevant";
* the definition of "proactive cooperation";

148. Rena Steinzor, Justice Department's Enforcement Policies Make Change for the
Worse, THE HILL (Feb. 21, 2018, 12:30 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/374857justice-depts-corporate-enforcement-policies-make-change-for-the-worse.
149. See discussion supra Section A.1.
150. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.
151. Id.
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* the definition of "timely preservation, collection, and disclosure of
relevant documents and information,";
* the definition of "de-confliction of witness interviews and other
investigative steps";
* the definition of "demonstration of thorough analysis of causes of
underlying conduct";
* the definition of "appropriate discipline of employees";
* the definition of "appropriate retention of business records," and
* the definition of "any additional steps that demonstrate recognition of
the seriousness of the company's misconduct, acceptance of
responsibility for it, and the implementation of measures to reduce the
risk of repetition of such misconduct, including measures to identify
future risks."' 52
In short, even gaining the greatest benefit under the CEP (a mere
requirement of a disgorgement / forfeiture enforcement action) is contingent
upon a business organization meeting the DOJs vague concepts of various
key terms. Indeed, as Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein stated: "The new
policy does not provide a guarantee. We cannot eliminate all uncertainty.
Preserving a measure of prosecutorial discretion is central to ensuring the
exercise of justice."1 53
Fourth, gaining the greatest benefit under the CEP is further contingent
upon the DOJ not finding the existence of certain "aggravating
circumstances."1 54 As stated in the CEP, these "aggravating circumstances"
are non-exclusive (which in and of itself is a big deal) and may include:
"involvement by executive management of the company in the misconduct; a
significant profit to the company from the misconduct; pervasiveness of the
misconduct within the company; and criminal recidivism." 155
Here again, the DOJ possesses absolute, unreviewable discretion as to the
existence of "aggravating circumstances" and the DOJ has refused to provide

152. Id
153. Rosenstein, supranote 5.
154. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.
155. Id
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greater clarity as to what certain key terms, such as "executive management"
and "significant profit," actually mean.' 56
Perhaps the most vague and ambiguous term is "criminal recidivism."
Does "criminal recidivism" refer to enforceability under the FCPA or any
criminal statute? Regardless of the answer, does "criminal recidivism" refer
to any form of DOJ resolution, such as (in addition to actual plea agreements)
deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, and
"declinations with disgorgement"? Here again, the DOJ has refused to provide
greater clarity. 157
Fifth, even if a business organization gains the greatest benefit under the
CEP (a "mere" requirement of a disgorgement/forfeiture enforcement action)
or failing this:
(i) because of "aggravating circumstances" a 50% reduction off of
the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) fine
range; or
(ii) because of the lack of voluntary disclosure an "up to a 25%
reduction off of the low end of the U.S.S.G. fine range," the DOJ
possesses extreme leverage and absolute, unreviewable
discretion as to what the disgorgement/forfeiture/guidelines
range amounts will be.
The reality is that this "final number" is the product of and contingent upon
several less than transparent discretionary calls made by the DOJ. Indeed, as
FCPA practitioners have rightly observed: "the exercise of calculating tainted
profits is subjective and is the focus of considerable negotiation with the DOJ
(and the SEC), often involving experts. Unsurprisingly, the government's
calculation of 'profits' often exceeds that of the disclosing party, and the
government has substantial leverage to impose its conclusion."'15
Sixth, the CEP states that even if "aggravating circumstances" are present
and thus a criminal resolution may be warranted that (for a company that
voluntarily disclosed, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately

.

156. Mike Koehler, Mum's the Word as the DOJ Declines to Provide Clarity About the
"Aggravating Circumstances" in Its New FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Dec. 6, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/mums-word-doj-declines-provide-clarityaggravating-circumstances-new-fcpa-corporate-enforcement-policy
157. See id.
158. ZACHARY S. BREZ ET AL., DOJ SOLIDIFIES AND SHARPENS FCPA ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE (Dec. 5, 2017).
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remediated) there will "generally" not be a requirement for "appointment of a
monitor." 159

While this sounds significant, in reality it isn't. In fact, very few FCPA
enforcement actions in recent years against U.S. companies (as opposed to
foreign companies) have required the formal appointment of a compliance
monitor. 160 Nevertheless, in nearly all instances the DOJ has required, as a
condition of settlement, that the company, through counsel, report to the DOJ
(and SEC) throughout the 1-3 year term of the resolution agreement.161 While
this is no doubt cheaper for the company than the appointment of a formal
monitor, such post-enforcement action reporting requirements can easily
aggregate into the millions of dollars and the CEP is silent on this form of
post-enforcement action reporting.
Seventh and implicit in the above reasons as well, for why the corporate
community should take the CEP with a grain of salt is perhaps obvious but
bears repeating: the DOJ is an adversary.
Imagine a business organization facing an adversary in other legal actions
where the adversary possesses absolute, unreviewable discretion as to how the
action will be resolved. It is doubtful that any business organization would
accede to the demands of this adversary and rightly so. While the DOJ
possesses bigger and sharper sticks than most legal adversaries, the two
simple fact remains: (1) the DOJ is an adversary to a business organization
under FCPA scrutiny, and (2) a business organization has no legal or moral
obligation to assist the DOJ.1 62 As Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein
rightly noted: "Of course, companies are free to choose not to comply with
the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy. A company needs to adhere to the
policy only if it wants the Department's prosecutors to follow the policy's
guidelines."163
In short, business managers and others making decisions on behalf of an
organization need to understand that thoroughly investigating an issue,
promptly implementing remedial measures, and effectively revising and
enhancing compliance policies and procedures-all internally and without
disclosing to the enforcement agencies-is a perfectly acceptable, legitimate,
and legal response to FCPA issues in but all the rarest of circumstances.

159. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 121.
160. See Mike Koehler, DOJ FCPA Enforcement 2017 Year in Review, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 16, 2018), http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-fcpa-enforcement-2017-year-review.
161. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at D- 1, United States v. Keppel Offshore
& Marine Ltd., No. 17-cr-697 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
162. See Rosenstein, supra note 5.
163. Id.
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An eighth reason why the corporate community, or at least so-called
"issuers" under the FCPA, should take the CEP with a grain of salt is that it is
an incomplete program because issuers are subject to FCPA enforcement by
both the DOJ and SEC. However, the CEP is a DOJ program only. To be sure,
just like the DOJ, the SEC has long encouraged voluntary disclosure of FCPA
violations coupled with repeated assurances that voluntary disclosure will
result in meaningful credit.1 64 However, unless and until the SEC articulates
a similar FCPA program (a program that will likely suffer from the same
deficiencies as the DOJ's program), the CEP addresses only half of the
enforcement landscape facing issuers.
The ninth and perhaps the biggest reason why the corporate community
should take the CEP with a grain of salt is that it only addresses a relatively
minor component of the overall financial consequences to a business
organization that is the subject of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement.
For obvious reasons, settlement amounts in an FCPA enforcement action
tend to get the most attention. After all, settlement amounts are mentioned in
DOJ/SEC press releases, press releases generate media coverage, and the
corporate community reads the media. However, knowledgeable observers
recognize, as depicted in the below representative picture, that FCPA scrutiny
and enforcement results in "three buckets" of financial exposure to a business
organization. 165

Rne-EnforcementAction

Enforcement Action Oay

Post-EnforcementActiom

164. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Securities and Exch. Comm'n Div. of Enf't, Keynote
Speech at the ACI's 33rd International Conference on the FCPA (Nov. 30, 2016) (transcript
available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-ceresney- 113016.html).
165. See Mike Koehler, Foreign CorruptPractices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. Bus. L. REV.
391, 393-94 (2014).
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In nearly every instance of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, bucket #1
(pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses) is the largest
financial hit to a business organization. The reasons for this are both practical
and potentially provocative.166 In terms of the practical, all instances of FCPA
scrutiny have a point of entry, for instance problematic conduct in China that
then often results (if there is a voluntary disclosure) in the "where else"
question from the enforcement agencies which often prompts the company
under scrutiny to conduct a much broader review of its business operations.
In terms of the provocative, FCPA scrutiny arising from voluntary disclosure
can easily become a billing boondoggle for FCPA Inc. participants.
A couple of specific examples highlight how extensive pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses can become.
For instance, Avon resolved an FCPA enforcement action for $135
million in aggregate DOJ and SEC settlement amounts but disclosed
approximately $550 million in pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses (a 2.5:1 ratio compared to the settlement amount). Likewise, Bruker
Corp. resolved an FCPA enforcement action for $2.2 million, but disclosed
approximately $22 million in pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses (a 10:1 ratio).1 67

Similarly, Hyperdynamics resolved an FCPA enforcement action for
$75,000, but disclosed approximately $12.7 million in pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses (a 170:1 ratio).1 68 Perhaps most eye-popping,
NATCO group resolved an FCPA enforcement action for $65,000, but
disclosed approximately $11 million in pre-enforcement action professional
fees and expenses (a 170:1 ratio).1 69
Even if the CEP was binding on the DOJ (which it is not), the fact is the
policy only addresses bucket #2 (settlement amount) and does not address preenforcement action professional fees and expenses-the biggest financial hit
to a business organization that is the subject of FCPA scrutiny.

166. See id. at 396-98.
167. Mike Koehler, Ten Reasons Why the Corporate Community Should Take the DOJ's
"FCPA CorporateEnforcement Policy " with a Grain ofSalt, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 7, 2017),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/ten-reasons-corporate-community-take-dojs-fcpa-corporateenforcement-policy-grain-salt.
168. Mike Koehler, Hyperdynamics Resolves FCPA Enforcement Action for $75,000, but
Spends $12.7 Million to Get There, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Sept. 30, 2015),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/hyperdynamics-resolves-fcpa-enforcement-action-for-75000-butspends-12-7-million-to-get-there.
169. Koehler, supra note 165 at 397 (citing Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES
(June 7, 2010), https://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washingtonextortion-mendelsohn-bribery-racket.html#68a0ac3flb5a).
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On this issue, it is perhaps notable that the CEP falls short and is less
explicit than the 2016 FCPA Pilot Program. On the issue of internal
investigations, the prior Pilot Program stated:
[T]he Fraud Section does not expect a small company to conduct as
expansive an investigation in as short a period of time as a Fortune
100 company. Nor do we generally expect a company to investigate
matters unrelated in time or subject to the matter under investigation
in order to qualify for full cooperation credit. An appropriately
tailored investigation is what typically should be required to receive
full cooperation credit; the company may, of course, for its own
business reasons seek to conduct a broader investigation.

For instance, absent facts to suggest a more widespread problem,
evidence of criminality in one country, without more, would not lead
to an expectation that an investigation would need to extend to other
countries. By contrast, evidence that the corporate team engaged in
criminal misconduct in overseeing one country also oversaw other
countries would normally trigger the need for a broader investigation.
In order to provide clarity as to the scope of an appropriately tailored
investigation, the business organization (whether through internal or
outside counsel, or both) is encouraged to consult with Fraud Section
attorneys."1

70

This language followed then Assistant Attorney General Caldwell's April
2015 statement that the DOJ "do[es] not expect companies to aimlessly boil
the ocean" in FCPA investigations.17' The mention of the scope and breath of
FCPA internal investigation in the 2016 Pilot Program was welcomed by the
corporate community and the absence of this issue in the CEP is notable.
Yet another reason why the corporate community should take the CEP
with a grain of salt is that it does not address the many other "ripple effects"
of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement.
A company (particularly an issuer) subject to FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement will often also experience several other negative financial

170. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 126, at 6 & n.5.
171. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at
New York University Law School's Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (Apr.
17, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-law).
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consequences above and beyond the "three buckets" of financial exposure
highlighted above.1 72 Such financial consequences can include a drop in
market capitalization, an increase in the cost of capital, a negative impact on
merger and acquisition activity, lost or delayed business opportunities, and
shareholder litigation. 173 In certain cases, these other negative financial
consequences can far exceed even the "three buckets" of financial
exposure. 174
Moreover, FCPA scrutiny and enforcement actions are increasingly
spawning related foreign law enforcement investigations and enforcement
actions. Indeed, as the DOJ is fond of saying, "an international approach is
being taken to combat an international criminal problem. We are sharing leads
with our international law enforcement counterparts, and they are sharing
them with us."

7

1

In short, corporate leaders need to fully understand and appreciate (in
addition to the specific issues discussed above) that a voluntary disclosure of
potential FCPA violations is going to set into motion a wide-ranging sequence
of events that will be far more costly to the company than any marginal
settlement amount benefit obtained through the CEP.
The deep gorge in the FCPA enforcement landscape visually depicted
earlier in this section is a concerning policy issue and it is a laudable goal of
the CEP (as well as the prior Pilot Program) to encourage voluntary disclosure
in order to enhance the DOJ's "ability to identify and punish culpable
individuals." 176
However, there is an even better alternative than the CEP to bridge this
gap. In this regard, it is notable that the CEP, which is after all based on the
2016 Pilot Program, is widely viewed as the brainchild of Andrew Weissmann
(whose signature appears on the Pilot Program). 7 7 Prior to Weissmann
becoming Chief of the DOJ's Fraud Section in January 2015, he was a vocal
critic of various aspects of the DOJ's FCPA enforcement program as well as
corporate criminal liability principles generally. 17' Among other things,
Weissmann advocated for an FCPA compliance defense and stated:

172. To learn more about this dynamic including specific examples, see Koehler, supra
note 167.
173. Koehler, supra note 165, at 393.
174. Id. at 451.
175. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 126, at 2.
176. See id.; Rosenstein, supra note 5.
177. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 126, at 9.
178. See generally Mike Koehler, FCPA Enforcement Critic and Reform Advocate
Selected as New DOJ Fraud Section Chief FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-enforcement-critic-and-reform-advocate-selected-as-new-doj-
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The FCPA should incentivize the company to establish compliance
systems that will actively discourage and detect bribery, but should
also permit companies that maintain such effective systems to avail
themselves of an affirmative defense to charges of FCPA violations.
This is so because in such countries even if companies have strong
compliance systems in place, a third-party vendor or errant employee
may be tempted to engage in acts that violate the business's explicit
anti-bribery policies. It is unfair to hold a business criminally liable
for behavior that was neither sanctioned by or known to the
business. 179
According to Weissmann, an FCPA compliance defense as well as other
FCPA reforms he advocated were "best suited for Congressional action."so
In other words, Weissmann did not believe that changes to DOJ policy (which
is all that the CEP and before that the Pilot Program represent) were enough.
Moreover, when the DOJ announced in Fall 2015 the appointment of a
compliance counsel to assist DOJ prosecutors in evaluating corporate
compliance programs at the time of improper conduct to determine if fine
reductions were warranted,"' Weissmann (widely viewed as the architect of
this position as well)' 82 stated that a motivation in creating the position was
to "empower a robust compliance function within organizations."' 83 Asked
what he "hope[d] to accomplish in general and specifically to assist the
compliance professional," Weissmann responded: "I hope that, in seeing how
seriously the Department of Justice takes compliance, we will strengthen the
voice of the compliance professionals and help them get a stronger seat at the
table as a key stakeholder in how businesses are run. "184
Whether it's the CEP's goal to, in the words of Deputy Attorney General
Rosenstein, "motivate[] and reward[] companies that want to do the right

fraud-section-chief (highlighting Weissmann's position and including links to original source
documents).
179. ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 6-7 (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal
Reform 2010).
180. Id. at 7.
181. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained
by the DOJ Fraud Section (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/790236/download.
182. See Interview by Laura Jacobus with Hui Chen, U.S. Dep't of Justice Compliance
Expert & Andrew Weissmann, Chief of U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. Fraud Section (Feb.
2, 2016), https://connects.ethics.org/blogs/laura-jacobus/2016/02/01/doj-interview.
183. Id
184. Id
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thing and voluntarily disclose misconduct,""' the prior Pilot Program's goal
of "encourage [ing] companies to implement strong anti-corruption
compliance programs to prevent and detect FCPA violations," 8 6 or simply to
best "empower a robust compliance function within organizations" and best
"strengthen the voice of the compliance professional[] [to] help them get a
strong seat at the table.,"1 7 there are better alternatives to accomplish these
laudable goals.
Like several former high-ranking DOJ officials and others, this author has
long argued that an FCPA compliance defense (an actual statutory
amendment, not merely a change in non-binding DOJ internal policy that
grants the DOJ a wide amount of discretion) can best allow the FCPA
enforcement agencies to accomplish their stated objectives." My 2012
Article "Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense" I
stated:
An FCPA compliance defense will better facilitate the DOJ's
prosecution of culpable individuals and advance the objectives of its
FCPA enforcement program. At present, business organizations that
learn through internal reporting mechanisms of rogue employee
conduct implicating the FCPA are often hesitant to report such
conduct to the enforcement authorities. In such situations, business
organizations are rightfully diffident to submit to the DOJ's opaque,
inconsistent, and unpredictable decision-making process and are
rightfully concerned that its pre-existing FCPA compliance policies
and procedures and its good-faith compliance efforts will not be
properly recognized. The end result is that the DOJ often does not
become aware of individuals who make improper payments in
violation of the FCPA and the individuals are thus not held legally
accountable for their actions. An FCPA compliance defense surely
will not cause every business organization that learns of rogue
employee conduct to disclose such conduct to the enforcement
agencies. However, it is reasonable to conclude that an FCPA
compliance defense will cause more organizations with robust FCPA
compliance policies and procedures to disclose rogue employee
conduct to the enforcement agencies. Thus, an FCPA compliance

185. Rosenstein, supranote 5.
186. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 126.
187. Interview by Laura Jacobus, supra note 182.
188. Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign CorruptPracticesComplianceDefense, Wis. L.
REV. 609, 609 (2012).
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defense can better facilitate DOJ prosecution of culpable individuals
and increase the deterrent effect of FCPA enforcement actions.1 89
This was written before the 2016 Pilot Program and obviously before the
CEP, but the logic still remains sound. Another policy objective that a
compliance defense can achieve better than the CEP is increasing "soft
enforcement" of the FCPA. In other words, a compliance defense can best
incentivize business organizations to implement more robust FCPA policies
and procedures and more robust policies and procedures can reduce instances
of improper conduct and thereby advance the FCPA's objectives. Critics of
an FCPA compliance defense have ignored its potential "soft enforcement"
impact focusing instead on "hard enforcement" issues such as the possibility
that the defense would prove to be unworkable in a contested proceeding or
lack practical value given that business organizations tend not to put the FCPA
enforcement agencies to their burdens of proof.1 90
Such criticisms of a compliance defense miss the point entirely. In passing
the FCPA, Congress anticipated that the "criminalization of foreign corporate
bribery will to a significant extent act as a self-enforcing preventative
mechanism."191 Likewise, since the FCPA's earliest days, the DOJ has
recognized that the "most efficient means of implementing the FCPA is
voluntary compliance by the American business community."1 92 Indeed,
Weissmann himself previously stated that FCPA reform should best motivate
compliance "on a daily basis" and "regardless of what the DOJ is doing." 19
This is precisely what a compliance defense can better accomplish than
the CEP. To best conceptualize this issue, consider three scenarios:
*

Scenario A: the landscape for at least the past decade with the
italicized language representing the prior Pilot Program and DOJ
compliance counsel position.

189. Id. at 659.
190. See Thomas R. Fox, Why a Compliance Defense Will Not Make a Compliance
Program Effective,
FCPA
COMPLIANCE
&
ETHICS
(Sept.
18,
2013),
http://fcpacompliancereport.com/2013/09/why-a-compliance-defense-will-not-make-acompliance-program-effective.
191. S. REP. No. 93-114, at 10 (1977).
192. Justice Outlines Priorities in Prosecuting Violations of Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, AMERICAN BANKER (Nov. 21, 1979).
193. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct: Before the Subcomm.
on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of
Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP).
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*

Scenario B: the new landscape as a result of the CEP.

*

Scenario C: the landscape if the FCPA were amended to include
a compliance defense.

Ask yourself under which scenario is a compliance officer most likely to
receive the budget and internal support to adopt best-in-class FCPA
compliance policies?
Scenario A

Compliance Officer: Boss, I need more money and resources to
devote to FCPA compliance.
Executive: Why?
Compliance Officer: Well, boss, if anything ever happens within our
business organization, an effective FCPA compliance program can
lessen the impact of our legal liability.
Executive: What do you mean?
Compliance Officer: Well, the money we spend on FCPA compliance
will not eliminate our legal exposure, but the DOJ (and SEC) have
said that the existence of an effective compliance program may
perhaps lower our criminal or civil fine or penalty amount and
perhaps even persuade an enforcement attorney to go lightly on us in
case our compliance program is ever circumvented by an employee.
Indeed, the DOJ has non-binding guidance under which it may offer
us a criminalfine reduction to the extent we voluntarily disclose any
conduct in breach of our FCPA policies, cooperate with the
enforcement agencies, and remediate. Moreover, the DOJ has a
compliance consultant on its staff who is going to assist DOJ
prosecutorsin evaluating our complianceprogram at the time of the
improperconduct to see if we should qualifyfor afine reduction.
Scenario B
Compliance Officer: Boss, I need more money and resources to
devote to FCPA compliance.
Executive: Why?
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Compliance Officer: Well, boss, if anything ever happens within our
business organization, an effective FCPA compliance program can
lessen the impact of our legal liability.
Executive: What do you mean?
Compliance Officer: Well, the money we spend on FCPA compliance
will not eliminate our legal exposure, but the DOJ (and SEC) have
said that the existence of an effective compliance program may
perhaps lower our criminal or civil fine or penalty amount and
perhaps even persuade an enforcement attorney to go lightly on us in
case our compliance program is ever circumvented by an employee.
In fact, the DOJ has a non-binding program which states that if a
company has voluntarily disclosed misconduct, fully cooperated, and
timely and appropriately remediated, there will be a presumption that
the company will receive a declination absent various vague
aggravating circumstances, subject, of course, to the requirement that
we pay all disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution resulting from
the alleged misconduct.
Scenario C
Compliance Officer: Boss, I need more money and resources to
devote to FCPA compliance.
Executive: Why?
Compliance Officer: Well, boss, an effective FCPA compliance
program can reduce our legal exposure as a matter of law.
Executive: What do you mean?
Compliance Officer: Well, the money we spend on investing in FCPA
best practices will be relevant as a matter of law. In other words, if
we make good faith efforts to comply with the FCPA when doing
business in the international marketplace, we will not face any legal
exposure when a non-executive employee or agent acts contrary to
our compliance policies and/or circumvents our policies.
Scenario C will likely best allow the compliance officer to receive the
budget and support needed to most effectively do his/her job. An FCPA
compliance defense will not magically result in 100% best-in-class FCPA
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compliance in all business organizations or cause all business organizations
to disclose all FCPA violations. However, the DOJ's announcement of the
CEP in 2017 (and prior to that the Pilot Program in 2016) are not the best
answers if the DOJ's true goals are to "motivate[] and reward[] companies
that want to do the right thing and voluntarily disclose misconduct,"1 94
"encourage companies to implement strong anti-corruption compliance
programs to prevent and detect FCPA violations,"1 95 best "empower a robust
compliance function within organizations" and best "strengthen the voice of
the compliance professional[] and help them get a strong seat at the table."1 96
In short, while certain FCPA commentators have called the CEP a "bold
new" development 97 this section exposes an obvious logical gap in the CEP
and uses the DOJ's own prior words and practices to demonstrate how the
CEP, both in terms of rhetoric and substance, is really nothing new. Because
of this, the corporate community should take the CEP with a grain of salt.
While the CEP's objectives are certainly laudable, it falls short of
accomplishing these goals compared to an FCPA compliance defense.
B. Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects the SEC's Disgorgement
Position in Kokesh
Another notable development from 2017 was the Supreme Court's
rejection of the SEC's disgorgement position in SEC v. Kokesh.1 98 The issue
before the court in Kokesh was whether SEC disgorgement is subject to a fiveyear statute of limitations and in a unanimous decision authored by Justice
Sotomayor the court rejected the SEC's position and held that
"[d]isgorgement in the securities-enforcement context is a 'penalty' within the
meaning of [28 U.S.C.] § 2462 and so disgorgement actions must be
commenced within five years of the date the claim accrues."1 99

194.
195.
196.
197.

Rosenstein, supranote 5.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 126.
Interview by Laura Jacobus, supra note 182.
LOUis RAMOS ET AL, NEW FCPA ENFORCEMENT POLICY PRESUMES DECLINATION
FOR COMPANIES THAT VOLUNTARILY DISCLOSE, COOPERATE, AND REMEDIATE 1 (Nov. 30,
2017).
198. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639-41 (2017).
199. Id. Kokesh represented the second time in recent years in which the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the SEC's statute of limitations position. In the 2013 case of Gabelli v.
SEC, the Supreme Court also unanimously rejected the SEC's expansive interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 2462 in cases involving civil penalties. See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 449, 454
(2013). Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected the SEC's argument that a discovery rule
should be read into § 2462 under which accrual is delayed until a plaintiff has "discovered" the
cause of action. Id. (citing Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 644 (2010)). The Supreme
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Although Kokesh did not involve an SEC FCPA enforcement action, the
case was FCPA relevant because the disgorgement remedy at issue in Kokesh
is the same disgorgement remedy the SEC frequently seeks in corporate FCPA
enforcement actions. For instance, in the 2012 FCPA Guidance, the DOJ/SEC
boldly proclaimed: "The five-year limitations period [applicable to the FCPA]
applies to SEC actions seeking civil penalties, but it does not prevent SEC
from seeking equitable remedies, such as an injunction or the disgorgement
of ill-gotten gains, for conduct pre-dating the five-year period."200 Indeed,
since the SEC first sought a disgorgement remedy in a 2004 FCPA
enforcement action, disgorgement has become the dominant remedy sought
by the SEC in corporate FCPA enforcement actions including for conduct
seemingly beyond the five-year limitations period.20 ' Accordingly, Kokesh
should impact SEC FCPA enforcement against issuers. However, statute of
limitations issues are meaningless when, as often occurs, issuers under FCPA
scrutiny waive statute of limitations defenses or agree to toll the statute of
limitations.202 Thus, whether Kokesh will impact SEC FCPA enforcement
depends on whether issuers will continue to roll over and play dead when
under FCPA scrutiny or actually mount a defense.
As stated by an FCPA practitioner (and former SEC Enforcement
Division attorney and DOJ Fraud Section prosecutor):
At bottom, acceding to an SEC request for a tolling agreement is
often a one-way bargain the SEC can continue its investigation at a
languid pace, and the individual or entity is not given any realbenefit,

Court stated that a discovery rule has merit where the plaintiff is a defrauded victim seeking
recompense, but that a discovery rule does not have merit when the plaintiff is the SEC in an
enforcement action seeking civil penalties. See id. at 449-52.
200. CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & THE ENF'T DIV. OF THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 35 (2012).
201. See Koehler, supra note 160.
202. See generally Newmont Mining Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-K) (March 31,
2017) ("We are conducting an investigation, with the assistance of outside counsel, relating to
certain business activities of the Company and its affiliates and contractors in countries outside
the U.S. The investigation includes a review of compliance with the requirements of the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other applicable laws and regulations. The Company has been
working with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the U.S. Department
of Justice with respect to the investigation. In March 2016, the Company entered into a one-year
agreement with the U.S. SEC tolling the statute of limitations relating to the investigation, and
in April 2016, entered into a similar agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice. Both of the
initial tolling agreements were effective through October 29, 2016. In September 2016, the
Company agreed to extend its tolling agreement with the Department of Justice through April
2017, and agreed to a similar extension with the SEC in October 2016.").
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except the continued specter of living under a lengthy investigation,
the timing of which is solely in the hands of the government. Often
lost on the enforcers is the personal or operational toll that living
under the uncertainty of a lengthy government investigation
causes[-]a toll that statutes of limitations were partly designed to
alleviate. While the assumed benefit to a tolling agreement is that the
SEC will not preemptively charge in order to avoid forfeiting its
ability to later do so, that suggests that absent agreeing to a tolling
agreement, the SEC would prematurely charge a half-baked case.
That seems a bluff worthy of calling.
Corporations, more so than individuals, traditionally shy away
from truly challenging SEC enforcement actions, especially FCPA
actions. In the forty years of FCPA enforcement, no corporation has
ever fully litigated the FCPA and taken the Commission to trial.
Although every inquiry is fact dependent, there is an established
pattern of corporations proving their cooperation to reach a
settlement, and that often involves one or more tolling agreements.
However, Kokesh and Gabelli should at least alter the calculus that
goes into making that decision. Those with a valid statute of
limitations defense to some or all of the potential claims against them
should zealously guard that defense and press the SEC as to how it
will prevail on violations occurring outside the five-year window.203
Since the Supreme Court's June 2017 decision in Kokesh, the SEC has
brought three corporate actions (Halliburton, Telia and Alere) and every
enforcement action included a disgorgement remedy based on conduct
seemingly beyond any conceivable statute of limitations. 204 Thus, at least
based on publicly-available resolution documents, Kokesh seems not to have
had an impact on SEC FCPA enforcement. What impact Kokesh may be
having on non-public SEC deliberations is more difficult to access, but in

203. Mike Koehler, Statute of Limitations Tolling in SEC Enforcement Actions PostKokesh An
Offer You
Can Refuse, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec.
21,
2018),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/statute-limitations-tolling-sec-enforcement-actions-post-kokeshoffer-can-refuse.
204. See Mike Koehler, FCPA and Then Some as Alere Resolves SEC Enforcement Action,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept.
29,
2017) (citing Alere, Inc., supra note 44),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-alere-resolves-sec-enforcement-action; Mike Koehler, Issues to
Consider from the Halliburton Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 2, 2017),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-consider-halliburton-enforcement-action; Mike Koehler, Issues
to Consider from the Telia Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 25, 2017),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-consider-telia-enforcement-action.
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November 2017 Steven Peikin (Co-Director of the SEC's Enforcement
Division) stated:
Kokesh is a very significant decision that has already had an impact
across many parts of our enforcement program. I expect it will have
particular significance for our FCPA matters, where disgorgement is
among the remedies typically sought.
While the ultimate impact of Kokesh on SEC enforcement as a
whole[-]and FCPA enforcement specifically[-]remains to be seen,
we have no choice but to respond by redoubling our efforts to bring
cases as quickly as possible. Even irrespective of Kokesh, this
approach makes sense because our cases have the highest impact, and
our litigation efforts are most effective, when we bring our cases
close in time to the alleged wrongful conduct."

205

Given that 4.5 years was the median length of time business organizations
that resolved FCPA enforcement actions in 2017 were under scrutiny, 206
anything that causes the FCPA enforcement agencies to bring "cases close in
time to the alleged wrongful conduct" represents a public policy victory
including for business organizations subject to the FCPA.
In short, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Kokesh should
impact SEC FCPA enforcement, but whether it will impact FCPA
enforcement remains to be seen. On this score and more broadly, it was hard
to ignore the following footnote in Kokesh:
Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on
whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied
disgorgement principles in this context. The sole question presented
in this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement
actions, is subject to § 2462's limitations period.207

205. Steven R. Peikin, Co-Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Enf't Div., Reflections on the
Past, Present, and Future of the SEC's Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov.
9, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin-2017-11-09).
206. Mike Koehler, The Gray Cloud ofFCPA Scrutiny Lasted Too Long in 2017, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 4, 2018), http://fcpaprofessor.com/gray-cloud-fcpa-scrutiny-lasted-long-2017.
207. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 n.3 (2017).
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During oral argument in Kokesh, several justices across the ideological
spectrum seemed concerned about the lack of a specific statutory basis for
SEC disgorgement. For instance, Justice Ginsberg stated:
Certainly disgorgement was not in the days of the common law what
it is today. Yet the SEC has been asking for this kind of relief now
for, what, over 30 years?
Has there been any effort, any activity in Congress to make this
clear, one way or another, whether disgorgement fits with
forfeiture?208
Justice Alito noted:
Well, this case puts us in a rather strange position, because we have
to decide whether this is a penalty or a forfeiture. But in order to
decide whether this thing is a penalty or a forfeiture, we need to
understand what this thing is. And in order to understand what it is,
it would certainly be helpful and maybe essential to know what the
authority for it is.
So how do we get out of that out of that situation? How do we
decide whether it is a penalty or a forfeiture without fully
understanding what this form of this remedy or this, whatever it is,
where it comes from and and its exact nature?" 209
Justice Sotomayor asked: "Could Congress pass a statute giving the SEC the
authority to bring these actions for however long a period Congress
chooses?" 210 Justice Kagan directed the following question to the SEC
attorney and thereafter commented:
Ms. Goldenberg ... has the SEC or has the Justice Department ever
set down in writing what the guidelines are for how the SEC is going
to use disgorgement and what's going to happen to the monies
collected?

208. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
209. Id. at 13.
210. Id. at 25.
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I must say I find it unusual that the SEC has not given some
guidance to its enforcement department or-or that the Department
of Justice hasn't become involved in some way; that that everything
is just sort of up to the particular person at the SEC who decides to
bring such a case. 2 11

Chief Justice Roberts stated:
One reason we have this problem is that the SEC devised this remedy
or relied on this remedy without any support from Congress. If
Congress had provided, here's a disgorgement remedy, you would
expect them, as they typically do, to say, here's a statute of limitations
that goes with it. And including, as your friend says, usually a statute
of limitations and an accompanying statute of repose.
Now, it was a concern you know, Chief Justice Marshall said
it was utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws to have a penalty
remedy without limit. Those were the days when you could write
something like that and it's about a statute of limitations. It's utterly
repugnant.
And it the concern, it sees seems to me, is multiplied when it's
not only no limitation, but it's something that the government kind of
devised on its own. I mean, I think-doesn't that cause concern?

... But it does seem to me that we kind of have a special obligation
to be concerned about how far back the government can go when it's
something that Congress did not address because it did not specify
the remedy. 212

If the Kokesh footnote was indeed inviting a future case that squarely
addresses the statutory basis for the SEC seeking a disgorgement remedy,
such a case could have an even bigger impact on the SEC's FCPA
enforcement program.

211. Id. at 29-30.
212. Id. at 31-33.
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The FCPA Turns 40

The detailed analysis of 2017 FCPA enforcement and related
developments in this article would be deficient without at least mentioning
that the FCPA turned forty years old in 2017213 -a development bound to
occur regardless of who won the 2016 Presidential election and regardless of
the enforcement theories advanced and resolution vehicles used in FCPA
enforcement actions. Upon the 40th anniversary of the FCPA, it is appropriate
to ask the salient question of whether the FCPA been successful in achieving
its objectives? Of course, to answer this question success in the FCPA context
must first be defined and admittedly, this is no easy task as there are various
plausible meanings of success in the FCPA context from "hard"
enforcement metrics (such as the number of actual FCPA enforcement actions
as well as outcomes in actual FCPA actions when government enforcement
agencies are put to their burden of proof) to "soft" enforcement metrics (such
as deterrence and voluntary compliance with the FCPA's provisions), to
"modeling" dynamics (namely whether the pioneering FCPA law motivated
other countries to enact similar laws).
Completely analyzing the question of whether the FCPA has been
successful in achieving its objectives is beyond the scope of this Article and
deserving of its own separate article. Yet, as relevant to 2017 FCPA
enforcement consider that three of the thirteen corporate enforcement actions
(approximately 25%) involved repeat offenders.2 14 Specifically, in addition to
resolving FCPA enforcement actions in 2017:
*

In 2012, Biomet resolved a $22.68 million FCPA enforcement
action involving alleged conduct in Brazil, Argentina, and
China.215

213. See Mike Koehler, The FCPA Turns 40, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-turns-40.
214. See Mike Koehler, CorporateFCPA Repeat Offenders, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 3,
2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/corporate-fcpa-repeat-offenders.
215. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Third Medical Device Company Resolves
Foreign
Corrupt
Practices
Act
Investigation
(Mar.
26,
2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-medical-device-company-resolves-foreign-corruptpractices-act-investigation; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Medical
Device
Company
Biomet
with
Foreign
Bribery
(Mar.
26,
2012),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-50htm.
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In 2012, Orthofix International resolved a $7.4 million FCPA
enforcement action involving alleged conduct in Mexico. 2 16

*

In 2009, Halliburton Company, KBR Inc. (a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Halliburton during the relevant time period) and
Kellogg, Brown & Root, LLC (a wholly-owned subsidiary of
KBR) resolved a $579 million enforcement involving alleged
conduct in Nigeria. 217

For many years, the DOJ has advanced the policy position that resolution
vehicles typically used to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement actions "have
had a truly transformative effect on particular companies and, more generally,
on corporate culture across the globe,"21 8 and that companies subject to such
resolution vehicles "have often undergone dramatic changes." 219 However,
what do these three examples of FCPA repeat offenders in a relatively short
time period say about the success of the FCPA and its enforcement? More
broadly, what does it say about the success of the FCPA when there has been
more enforcement (not less) as the FCPA has matured? Granted, politicians
have been known to make aspirational statements, but when enacting the
FCPA members of Congress stated:
"The legislation before the committee ...
bribery. . . ."220

would end corporate

"[T]he goal [of the FCPA] is the elimination of foreign
bribery." 22 1

These aspirational goals clearly have not been met, but perhaps they were
unrealistic to begin with. In any event, whether it's the several examples of

216. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Orthofix International with
FCPA Violations (July 10, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-133htm.
217. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kellogg-brown-root-llc-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-chargesand-agrees-pay-402-million; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges KBR and
Halliburton for FCPA Violations (last updated Feb. 17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.
218. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Remarks to the New York City Bar
Association (last updated Sept. 17, 2014).
219. U. S. FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2012).
220. 122 CONG. REc. 12,099 (1976) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire).
221. H.R. REP No. 95-640, at 19-20 (1977).
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FCPA repeat offenders in 2017 or the broader topic highlighted above, readers
are encouraged to contemplate the salient question of whether the FCPA, at
its 40th anniversary, has been successful in achieving its objectives.
III. CONCLUSION

In many respects, 2017 was a transition year, but in the FCPA space it
was a year of continuity. As highlighted in this Article, despite "doom and
gloom" predictions about the FCPA and its enforcement in the new Trump
administration, 2017 witnessed a continuation of robust FCPA enforcement
involving the same enforcement theories and same resolution vehicles used in
prior administrations as well as a continuation of certain concerning
enforcement practices.
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